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MEDICINE AND LAW AS MODEL
PROFESSIONS: THE HEART OF THE
MATTER (AND HOW WE HAVE
MISSED IT)
Rob Atkinson†
“Now I’ll put my meaning in a clearer light, if I can. I maintain
that these two, body and soul, have two arts corresponding to them;
that which deals with the soul I call government, but though the subject of physical welfare constitutes a unity I cannot find a single name
for the art which deals with the body, which has two branches, training and medicine. In the art of government what corresponds to
training is called legislation and what corresponds to medicine is
called the administration of justice. The members of each of these
pairs, training and medicine, legislation and justice, have something
in common, because they are concerned with the same object, but they

†

Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. The Florida
State University College of Law has generously supported my scholarship in professionalism and other fields for nearly a quarter of a century now, most generously
under the nearly two decades of Donald Weidner’s admirable deanship. On this
particular project I am indebted to my research assistants Sara Hassler and Hannah
Monroe and to the staff of the FSU College of Law and its Research Center for invaluable support, always cheerfully given. To two of my colleagues who work much
more than I at the intersection of law and medicine, Marshall Kapp and Reid Fontaine, I owe special thanks for helping me find this article its happy placement here in
Health Matrix.
In writing this article, I have often thought of my brother, Ernest McIntosh
Atkinson, a family practitioner; my sister, Louise Atkinson Witherspoon, a physical
therapist; and our late father, Robert Edward Atkinson, a rural veterinarian. In our
father’s large and small animal practice in Williamsburg County, South Carolina, we
as children learned the kind of care that I have come to see as the core of the properly
professional practice of medicine. In this paper I have found myself describing the
standard of care that my father delivered his entire working life. No one could give or
receive better care, or greater love. May the day soon dawn when the kind of care
our father gave the animals of that rural community, livestock no less than pets, becomes the birthright of every human being born anywhere in the world. If this paper
could help hasten that day, then my professional work would properly stand alongside
his, and theirs.
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are different from one another nonetheless. We have then these four
arts, constantly concerned with the highest welfare of the body and
soul respectively . . . .”
Plato1
“The secret of the care of the patient is in caring for the patient.”
Dr. Francis Weld Peabody 2
“[A] lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may call himself an architect.”
Sir Walter Scott3

ABSTRACT
This article has two coordinate goals: to undergird the functionalist understanding of professionalism with classical normative theory
and to advance the classical theory of civic virtue with the insights of
modern social science. More specifically, this article seeks to connect
classical theories about the care of the body and the soul with modern
theories of market and government failure. The first step is to distinguish two kinds of professions, caring professions like medicine and
public professions like law, by identifying the distinctive virtue of
each. The distinctive virtue of the caring professions is single-minded
commitment to those in their care, their principals, to the virtual exclusion of all other concerns; the distinctive virtue of the public professions is commitment to the common good, sometimes even at the
expense of their principals’ self-defined interest. The next step is to
show how these two distinctive professional virtues, the one principalprotecting, the other public-protecting, branch from the same root, the
common function of all proper professions: guaranteeing the delivery
of socially essential but necessarily esoteric knowledge when the usu1

PLATO, GORGIAS 45–46 (Walter Hamilton trans., 1960) (statement attributed to Socrates).
2
JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 54 (2007) (quoting textual
language as “[o]ne of the most celebrated statements in clinical medicine”).
3
WALTER SCOTT, GUY MANNERING 213 (P.D. Garside ed., Edinburgh University Press 1999) (1815).
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al protections of both private contracts and government regulation
systematically fail. The third and final step is to map out the implications of this neo-classical understanding of professionalism, beginning
at its core in the paradigmatic caring and public professions of medicine and law, through putative professions that take these as their
models, to the kind of republican society that places care of individuals and concern for the public welfare at the center of its value system.
The result of this analysis should be not only a fuller theoretical appreciation of professionalism’s proper function, but also a practical
guide to professionals themselves for better service to both the individuals in their care and the common good of all humankind.
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b) Exceptions that Prove the Rules: Branches of One
Profession with the Virtues of the Other ................. 407
c) On the Frontiers of the Paradigmatic Professions ... 407
(1) False Positives: Faux Professions ....................... 408
(2) False Negatives: Unrecognized Professions ....... 408
B. The Professions and Other Occupations ........................ 409
1. Professional Virtue as Neo-Classical, not RetroVictorian ..................................................................... 410
2. Professional Virtue, the Virtues of Other Occupations,
and Other Occupational Virtues ................................. 411
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Times and Places ........................................................ 414
a) The Necessary Knowledge Base. ............................ 415
b) The Relative Strength of Complementary Social
Institutions. .............................................................. 416
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Serve ........................................................................ 416
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Mirrors ........................................................................... 418
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of the Republic ................................................ 420
INTRODUCTION
Nearly everyone takes the three classic professions to be law,
medicine, and the clergy.4 By virtually all accounts – professional
and lay, practical and theoretical, favorable and critical – this trinity of
occupations, holy or otherwise, shares the core of what a profession
should be. The breadth of this agreement is hardly an accident; it contains more than a grain of truth. But this agreement needs deeper
analysis, because it also contains a fundamental mistake: the assump4

ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 32 (1986) (“As we all know, the
medieval universities of Europe spawned the three original learned professions of
medicine, law, and the clergy (of which university teaching was part).”); MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4–5
(1977) (“In the Anglo-Saxon world at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
recognized gentlemanly professions were, in practice, only three: divinity, and its
recent offshoot of university teaching; the law . . . and the profession of medicine.”).
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tion that all three classic professions, and by extension all proper
modern professions, rest on the same foundation of liberal learning.
That assumption is demonstrably false, and its consequences have
been pernicious.
From that bad seed has grown many a thorny problem in the academic study, self-perception, and public appreciation of the professions. We need to learn about the three classic professions what Sesame Street teaches about other incongruous catalogings: “One of these
things is not like the others; one of these things doesn’t belong.”5 The
odd one out among the classic professions, this article argues, is medicine; once we see why the practice of medicine does not necessarily
entail liberal learning, we can appreciate not only medicine’s distinctive and legitimate claim to professional status, but also the common
function of all proper professions.
By contrast, the practice of law, properly understood, closely approximates functionalist theory’s ideal type of the classic profession:
an occupation that serves an essential social value by combining esoteric technical knowledge with general cultural knowledge in a way
that neither the regulatory state nor for-profit firms can guarantee as
well, alone or together, as the occupation’s own institutions.6 With
necessary adjustments for the clergy’s place in modern secular societies, an equally plausible case can be made for that occupation’s professional standing as well.7 The problem lies with medicine, the third
member of the classic professional trinity that is now very much primus inter pares.
Medicine’s status as a profession poses this basic dilemma. On
the one hand, the practice of medicine is not only a supremely important occupation, as Socrates anciently insisted; it is also the paradigmatic profession in our modern world. Physicians now eclipse
lawyers and the clergy in what, at least for the laity, are the hallmarks
of professional status: income, prestige, and power. In explicit
recognition of this standing, theorists of professionalism have tended
to take the practice of medicine as our society’s closest approximation

5

One
of
These
Things:
Hat,
SESAME
STREET,
http://www.sesamestreet.org/video_player/-/pgpv/videoplayer/0/96480d64-694e44dc-8140-8c65f68d93cb (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
6
See Robert E. Atkinson, Jr., Laying the Foundations for Neo-Classical
Professionalism in Law and Business, 10 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2013).
7
See Rob Atkinson, The Western Christian Clergy: From Most Professionalized Occupation to Least (and Back?) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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to the ideal-type profession, the model of what a profession should be
if it were to function properly.8
On the other hand, the practice of medicine today lacks what professionalism’s most sophisticated defenders take to be one of an idealtype profession’s defining attributes: an essential link between highly
technical, socially valuable knowledge and a university-level liberal
education. Put less abstractly, this is the rub: to serve you well, your
lawyer, when you really need one (and your clergy-person, should you
ever want one) must have not only a deep knowledge of the humanities, but also at least a passing familiarity with both the physical and
the social sciences; your physician need only know the “hard” sciences (unless it is your psyche that is sick).9
This article addresses the dilemma of medicine’s professional status with a double thesis: (1) the common core of all proper professions
is a peculiar genus of occupational virtue; and (2) that genus has two
main species, the principal-protecting, or caring, and the publicprotecting, or public. That is the heart of the matter we have missed:
the practice of medicine is the proper paradigm, not of professionalism in general, but of the caring professions in particular. Medical
doctors need not master liberal learning to perform their social function properly.
But that function itself is literally vital: preserving and promoting
life itself, the very foundation of all other human values. To perform
that function properly, medical doctors must take the care of their
individual patients as wholly to heart as is humanly possible. We,
both as individuals and as a society, deeply want our doctors, day in
and day out, to be caring and careful, to care for our lives as much and
8

See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001); ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED
KNOWLEDGE (1970); LARSON, supra note 4, at xi (“The elements that compose the
ideal-type profession appear to be drawn from the practice and from the ideology of
the established professions; medicine, therefore, as the most powerful and successful
of these, should approximate most closely the sociological criteria of what professions
are and do.”); Harold J. Cook, Good Advice and Little Medicine: The Professional
Authority of Early Modern English Physicians, 33 J. BRITISH STUD. 1, 2 (1994) (“As
one of the three learned professions surviving from the Middle Ages, the ‘medical
profession’ has been a crucial test case for various definitions of what a profession is
or was.”) (citation omitted). Id. at n.1 (listing examples of major sociological studies
of professionalism that have focused on medicine); see also ANDREW ABBOTT, THE
SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 20 (1988)
(“Let us begin with the familiar case of American medicine.”). Id. at 189 (“The most
familiar example of the shift to scientific legitimacy claims is that of nineteenth century medicine.”).
9
We take up the exceptional case of psychotherapy later in this article. See
infra Part III.A.2.
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as well as they can, to the very limits of human capability. Doctors
routinely hold our very lives, sometimes quite literally our hearts, in
their hands. The kind of care appropriate to that situation is precisely
what sets medicine apart as a profession and makes it the paradigm of
all caring professions.
Again, to put the matter less abstractly, if your lawyer is a bit
careless in handling your case (and if your plea is not for an eleventhhour stay of execution), you’ll most likely live to have a second lawyer amend any mistakes your first may have made. But if your family
doctor fails to notice that that mold just above your hairline has taken
an angry turn since your last routine check-up, you may very well die
of metastatic melanoma, quite soon and quite painfully.10
Medicine, then, is better seen as the model, not of a learned profession, but of a caring profession. We certainly need doctors, and we
need those doctors to be deeply committed to our care, not just rigorously trained and closely regulated. But those doctors do not generally need, as an essential part of their job-performance, a thorough
grounding in the humanities and social sciences.
Failing to appreciate this distinction between a learned profession
and a caring profession has had the most profound of consequences, in
both theory and practice. On the theoretical side, it has fundamentally
distorted our understanding of professionalism itself. On the practical
side, it has seriously jeopardized the proper education of professionals. And that, in turn, has jeopardized the proper rendering of professional services, and thus the good of both individuals and society, not
least our professionals themselves. We have made a very big mistake
about medicine, and we need to fix it fast.
Part I of this paper begins this reassessment of medicine’s unique
status as a profession by sketching the necessary background: the
broader debate over whether any occupation, in order to apply specialized knowledge to an essential social function, must be organized
along the lines of the classic professions, with its members’ performance guaranteed in important part by institutions internal to the occupation itself and distinct from the institutions of both the market and
the state. The second section of Part I isolates the problem of medicine under the prevailing definition. Although classic professionalism
theory holds that the professions must entail a wedding of technical

10
As your medical file closes, of course, your legal file may open. Once
you’re gone, your lawyer can see that your family is fully compensated for your doctor’s oversight, at least in the contemplation of the law. But that legal relief is likely
to be small consolation to your loved ones (not to mention you!), a distant secondbest to the longer, fuller life that proper medical care would have given you.
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knowledge and general knowledge,11 the need for that “wedding” is
dubious in the case of medicine. This section shows why the practice
of medicine, in contrast to law, does not really require a liberal education, and thus why medicine’s distinctive occupational status must be
found elsewhere.
Part II undertakes that more positive task. The first step is to distinguish two kinds of professions—caring professions like medicine
and public professions like law—by identifying the distinctive virtue
of each. The distinctive virtue of the caring professions is singleminded commitment to those in their care, their principals, to the virtual exclusion of all other concerns; the distinctive virtue of the public
professions is commitment to the common good, sometimes even at
the expense of their principals’ self-defined interest. The next step is
to show how these two distinctive professional virtues branch from
the same root, the common function of all proper professions: guaranteeing the delivery of socially essential but necessarily esoteric
knowledge when the usual protections of both private contracts and
government regulation systematically fail. Building upon these insights—the fundamental structure of professional virtue and the essential role of professional institutions in promoting that virtue—the final
section of Part II outlines a refinement of the functionalist theory of
the professions.
Part III works out the implications of that refined theory of the
professions, in principle and in practice, from the specific to the general. Its first section applies that theory to the paradigmatic caring and
public professions, medicine and law. The second section widens the
focus of the revised theory to examine the professional claims of other
occupations and to compare professional virtues with other occupational virtues. The final section turns the analytic lens around and
raises, albeit only in a tentative way, the converse question: What kind
of society does the neo-classical theory of the professions imply?
Answering that question highlights the neo-classical republican elements in our present society, shared norms beyond both majority will
and consumer preference.
And that, in turn, brings us around to understanding the problem
with which we began: mistaking liberal learning as an essential element of the practice of medicine. A neo-classical republic honors
wisdom above all other virtues. Its lawyers must make that virtue the
foundation of their profession, if they are to protect the common good;
all of its ablest citizens—doctors as well as lawyers, layfolk as well as

11

FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121.
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professionals—must make wisdom not only the goal of their personal
lives, but also the measure of their commonwealth.
I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FAUX PAS: MISTAKING LIBERAL
LEARNING AS ESSENTIAL TO ALL PROPER PROFESSIONS

Certain occupations in our society have secured especially high
social, economic, and political status by successfully claiming that
they alone can best provide socially essential esoteric knowledge, and
only under conditions of considerable occupational autonomy. These
are the professions. The professions pose to those who study them
two basic questions, one descriptive, the other normative. The descriptive question is this: What identifiable aspects of an occupation
qualify it as a profession? The answer to that descriptive question, in
turn, poses the normative question: Does a given profession—or any
profession at all—actually merit its special status?
Students of the professions have tended to agree on the answer to
the basic descriptive question, what an ideal-type profession would
look like, even as they radically divide in their answer to the basic
normative question, whether professions are a necessary mode of organizing the provision of certain services essential to the common
good, or whether professions are the means by which certain occupations have been able to gain control of the provision of certain services to their own advantage as suppliers and to the detriment of the
public as consumers.12 Functionalists believe the professions serve
the common good;13 revisionists insist that they subvert it.14
12

Or, as stated by a contemporary sociologist of the professions,
The crucial characteristic of the knowledge systems of professionals,
as they have been perceived in the discussions of professionalism of
recent years, is to what extent they really serve a problem-solving
purpose which in turn gives power and prestige to the owners of this
capacity, or to what extent the knowledge is a symbolic value that
serves the purpose of being something that can be brought forward in
other people’s eyes as important but which has no clear relation to the
problem-solving capacity of professionals.

Rolf Torstendahl, Introduction: Promotion and Strategies of Knowledge-Based
Groups, in THE FORMATION OF PROFESSIONS: KNOWLEDGE, STATE AND STRATEGY 1, 3
(Rolf Torstendahl & Michael Burrage, eds., 1990).
13
See, e.g., TALCOTT P ARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in
ESSAYS IN S OCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43 (1954).
14
The leading general work in this vein is LARSON, supra note 4; as for the
legal profession in particular, see Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions
of Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 186, 186–
87 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S
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All scholars, functionalists and revisionists alike, agree that any
occupation’s claim to professional status rests on applying a body of
specialized knowledge in the provision of an essential service, the
proper delivery of which can only be guaranteed by institutions internal to the occupation itself and relatively independent of both the
market and the state.15 This claim has three distinct components: (1)
certain occupations provide essential services that entail a distinctive
kind of knowledge; (2) optimal provision of those services cannot be
guaranteed by ordinary contracts between service providers and service consumers, even with the routine intervention of the regulatory
state; but (3) institutions within the occupation itself can, given sufficient power and autonomy, ensure optimal provision (or, more precisely, provision that is superior to any feasible alternative).16 Functionalist defenders of professionalism affirm all three of these propositions; revisionist critics challenge one or more.
But, again, all scholars implicitly agree that, if there are to be legitimate professions, these three conditions must all be met. What is
more, scholars also generally agree that medicine is the paradigmatic
profession.17 If any occupation deserves to be a profession, it is medicine; if medicine cannot be shown to warrant professional status, neither can any other occupation. Part I shows how both halves of this
double claim come a cropper when we look closely at medicine and
law under the prevailing paradigm: on the one hand, not all classic
professions are necessarily learned, because medicine cannot be
shown to require liberal learning; on the other hand, liberal learning is
essential to at least one other classic profession, the law.
Part I.A sets out the general understanding of professions as
uniquely effective providers of specialized knowledge, using the classic professions of law and medicine as examples. Part I.B narrows the
focus on professional knowledge to isolate what is supposed to separate proper professions from other occupations that entail special
knowledge, traditional artisans on the one hand and modern techniDILEMMA 16 (Penguin Books reprt. 1965) (calling professions “conspiracies against
the laity”); and see also ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 7 (“For some, professionalism was a
means of controlling a difficult social relation; for others, a species of corporate extortion.”).
15
See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 7–8 (noting that theorists of the professions
“[c]ertainly all agreed that a profession was an occupational group with some special
skill” and using as his own working definition of professions “exclusive occupational
groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases”).
16
See LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, BUSINESS – A PROFESSION 2 (1914).
17
See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 9, at 181;
see LARSON, supra note 5, at xi; see also ABBOTT, supra note 9, at 30 (“It has been
easy to mistake American medicine for the paradigm [of professional life].”).
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cians on the other. Unlike artisans and technicians, proper professions
are said to be “learned”; their members must master not only a body
of special occupational knowledge, but also the advanced cultural
knowledge associated with a college-level liberal education.18 Part
I.C then looks for that hybrid of special and general knowledge in two
paradigmatically learned professions, law and medicine. This search
yields decidedly different results for law and medicine. The general
assumption that professional services necessarily entail liberal learning nicely fits the practice of law but poses insurmountable problems
when applied to medicine. A central aspect of the practice of law—
making plausible appeals to the public good—requires just that integration of advanced occupational and cultural knowledge. But the
same cannot be said of medicine; its claim to professional status, as
Part II shows, must lie elsewhere.
A.

The Functionalist Thesis: Professions as a Response to Both Market and Government Failure in
the Provision of Necessary Specialized Knowledge

As we have seen, all students of the professions, from the most
optimistic functionalist to the most skeptical revisionist, agree on this:
the legitimacy of any occupation’s claim to be organized as an idealtype profession rests on that occupation’s delivery of a particular kind
of specialized knowledge. To qualify as a profession, an occupation
must deliver a form of esoteric knowledge that is essential to the performance of an important social function but that cannot be guaranteed by either the market or the state, but only by largely autonomous
institutions of the occupation itself.19
This is, admittedly, both a complex and an abstract formula. The
first step in unpacking it is to notice that it entails implicit claims of
superiority to two other sources or guarantors of that specialized
18
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121
(“The ideology of professionalism asserts knowledge that is not merely the narrow
depth of the technician, or the shallow breadth of a generalist, but rather a wedding of
the two in a unique marriage. This wedding of liberal education to specialized training
qualifies professionals to be more than mere technicians.”).
19
Id. at 78–79 (“In professionalism, sheltered labor markets for particular
jurisdictions in a division of labor are created on the basis of a claim to be able to
perform a defined set of discretionary tasks satisfactorily.”). See Torstendahl, supra
note 12, at 3 (noting agreement of professionalism scholars on centrality of claims
about specialized knowledge). Functionalism had earlier proponents among social
reformers who were also theorists, particularly Louis Brandeis in the United States
and R. H. Tawney in the United Kingdom. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 123 (1998) (noting close parallels between
Progressives like Brandeis and functionalist sociologists like Parsons).
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knowledge, the market and the state. The professions, in other words,
are a double default mode in our basic system of state-regulated capitalist markets. In that system, consumers’ first recourse for
knowledge beyond their ken is to enter into ordinary contracts with
private, for-profit firms; if those for some reason fail, consumers then
look to government intervention in the market. Only when routine
market provision and state regulation both fail do consumers look to
professions as the appropriate providers. To understand the claims of
professionalism to provide special knowledge, then, we need to look
first for the kind of special knowledge that would not be readily available by purchase from private firms through garden-variety, two-party
contracts.
But that is just the first step to showing why the occupation must
be organized as a profession. Having identified this specialized
knowledge, we must then identify reasons why government intervention is not an appropriate remedy. The professions’ claim to provide
specialized knowledge, in other words, will require both a market
failure theory and a government failure theory. And so it does.20
1.

Market Failures in the Provision of
Specialized Knowledge

The claim that professions provide specialized knowledge unavailable from ordinary private firms involves two common forms of
market failure identified by neo-classical economists, information
asymmetries and externalities.21 The former market failure occurs
between the consumer and the provider; the latter occurs between the
consumer and provider, on the one hand, and third parties, strangers to
the transaction between the provider and consumer, on the other.22 To
illustrate both kinds of problems, let’s consider a paradigmatic medi20
Analysis comes from the following law review article and the sources
cited therein: Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 271–73 (1995).
21
As I have noted elsewhere, the standard account of the professions was
first theoretically articulated by sociologists, and theirs is still the most detailed account. See id. at 272–73. For purposes of our analysis, however, functionalism’s
primary thesis is most cogently outlined in terms of neo-classical economics. Id.
22
See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 489 (1988) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (warning that lawyers have the power to abuse their clients for their
own benefit and the legal system for their clients’ benefit); RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 92–93 (1995) (arguing that competitive pressures force lawyers to
focus on serving the customer, their client, at the expense of the courts and the community); Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1922 (1993).
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cal activity, surgery, and a paradigmatic lawyerly activity, medical
malpractice litigation.
a.

Information
Asymmetries:
The
Threat of Professionals to their Own
Principals

With respect to consumers of professional services, the problem is
information asymmetry.23 Remember the underlying facts in Hawkins
v. McGee,24 the contracts casebook classic.25 A young man needs a
skin transplant to restore a badly injured hand. He can neither perform the operation himself nor learn how at reasonable cost. Even if
he knew how, it would be devilishly difficult to do the work himself,
literally single-handedly. What is more, he cannot assess at reasonable cost whether anyone who purports to have the necessary
knowledge and skill actually does have it and can be trusted to use it
properly. He seems to need a professional, someone whom knowledgeable and trustworthy third parties certify has the necessary skills
and applies them appropriately.
That was not, of course, quite what Mr. Hawkins got. Either because Dr. McGee lacked the relevant knowledge or because he failed
to apply that knowledge properly to Mr. Hawkins’s hand, the hair
follicles of the skin transplanted to his palm were not destroyed; Mr.
Hawkins was left, as every first-year law student knows, with a “hairy
hand,” the basis for a malpractice suit against Dr. McGee.26
Mr. Hawkins sought from his lawyer, as from his doctor, the
proper application of specialized knowledge. Here, too, he would
have met information asymmetries. A litigator must be able to assess
the relative merits of the client’s case, the likely gains from prevailing
in that case over against the costs of prosecuting it, and the relative
advantages of other modes of pursuing relief. And this is only the
23
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 112–13 (7th ed.
2007); MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
66–67 (1996). See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at
79 (“The requirement of discretionary specializations . . . and most particularly those
based on esoteric, abstract theory, poses a serious problem to prospective labor consumers. How are they to judge whether a particular worker is able to perform tasks
adequately?”).
24
146 A. 641, 642–43 (N.H. 1929).
25
THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 259–62 (3d ed. 1999); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 190–93 (8th ed. 2006); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ET
AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 2–4 (7th ed. 2008); JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL.,
CONTRACTS CASES AND COMMENTS 2–6 (9th ed. 2008).
26
DAWSON, supra note 25, at 2–6.
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beginning. Once the case is underway, the lawyer must make a host
of similarly complex assessments: whether to call a particular witness,
whether to make an especially novel argument, whether to invoke an
obscure line of precedent. The appropriate answer to each of these
questions is difficult for lay-folk like Mr. Hawkins to assess. He cannot know whether a particular claim or strategy will succeed without
studying law himself or taking other self-protective measures that are
prohibitively expensive. As with Mr. Hawkins’s doctor, then, so too
with his lawyer: the services he needs from the one, like those from
the other, are so unusual or complex that ordinary consumers like him
cannot, at reasonable cost to themselves, independently evaluate
whether the service actually delivered is of the quality promised or
reasonably expected.27 To assess whether their lawyers and doctors
get these decisions right, clients and patients would need to have precisely the kind of knowledge that they lack, the kind of knowledge
that leads them to need, and to hire, a lawyer or doctor in the first
place.28
Conversely, both surgeons and litigators have an incentive to
trade on their superior knowledge—and consumers’ relative ignorance—to the consumers’ disadvantage, in either of two basic ways.
They can claim to have special expertise they lack, or they can cut
corners and fail to take proper care in providing the knowledge they
do have. The usual rule of the market, caveat emptor, would work
badly in such cases; here the buyer may not know what to beware of,
or even to beware at all. The fundamental problem for the consumers
of services involving esoteric occupational knowledge, then, is one of
information asymmetry—buying, not the proverbial pig in a poke, but
the performance of a service in a black box. In the case of lawyers,
that black box is the camera obscura of litigation; in the case of doctors, it may literally be the client’s own skull, rib cage, or abdominal
cavity.

27

DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 646 (1st ed. 1992)
(describing “information barriers” as the inability of consumers to accurately assess
the legal services they receive and concluding that this is an appropriate reason to
regulate lawyers); see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 490 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that ordinary fraud provisions cannot protect clients from lawyers’ abuse of specialized knowledge).
28
See SIMON, supra note 19, at 123 (“The market is not viable because consumers lack the expertise to evaluate the quality of such services.”).
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Externalities: The Threat of
Professionals and their Principals to
Third Parties and the Public

Information asymmetries, we have seen, are the problem that putative professionals pose to the purchasers of their services. The purchase of professional services poses a second set of problems, externalities, to those outside the transaction. Because some costs and
benefits of a transaction do not affect the parties to the transaction, but
are in that sense “external” to them, the parties tend to ignore them.
As a result, they tend to produce and consume the service in socially
non-optimal amounts, and the consequences of their less than ideal
consumption decisions fall on others.29 In our paradigmatic medical
and legal services (surgery and litigation), two recurrent problems—
undercompetence and overzealousness—nicely illustrate the basic
externality problems.
(1)

Undercompetence

Let’s consider first the simpler problem, undercompetence. As
we have already seen, undercompetence is often a problem for the
purchaser of the service; Dr. McGee’s undercompetence is probably
what caused Mr. Hawkins’s “hairy hand.” But that will not always be
the case. If a consumer is in a position to recognize undercompetence
or minimize its risks, that consumer may well use it to his or her advantage. Thus a client might well be willing to hire a lawyer relatively lacking in basic professional knowledge, on the assumption that
such a lawyer will be comparatively cheap, even though the client
knows the quality of service delivered will be correspondingly low.
Assuming the client can assess the quality of the service delivered (in
other words, there is no information asymmetry), and looking only at
the transaction in terms of the lawyer and client, this is not particularly troubling. Some go to orthopedists with their back pain, others
consult chiropractors or Christian Science healers, still others selfmedicate with alcohol or other drugs. Similarly, some discuss the
viability of their legal claims with lawyers, others never get past their
bar tenders, or file pro se in small claims court. All, we can assume
for present purposes, get what they pay for.
But the costs of undercompetence may not always be so nicely
self-contained within the relationship of consumer and supplier, the
29

See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982) (presenting
the elimination of “spillover” costs as the classical rationale for governmental regulation).
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client and lawyer in our example. If the ill-preparedness of the lawyer
causes delays in court, or requires the judge to spend time and energy
prompting or correcting the lawyer, then some of the costs of undercompetence are borne, not by the consumer (the lawyer’s client), but
by the rest of us, in the form of docket crowding or additional judges.
So, too, with at least some forms of health care. If my faith healer
fails to reduce my back pain, the discomfort is pretty much limited to
me (although I may remain a pretty grouchy co-worker). But if my
doctor dismisses my cough as the symptom of a common cold, rather
than diagnosing it as an early sign of tuberculosis, you too may suffer,
particularly if I’m your caterer or barista. Thus society, on purely
efficiency grounds, has a legitimate interest in preventing consumers
from externalizing such costs, whether they be associated with legal
assistance or health care.30
(2)

Excessive Zeal

Excessive zeal, the second source of externalities relevant to our
analysis, is essentially the converse of undercompetence. Service
providers can be excessively as well as insufficiently attentive to their
clients, and this excessive zeal can produce external costs of its own.31
Suppose litigational delay on the lawyer’s part is not a by-product of
undercompetence, but a carefully calculated strategy to achieve client
advantage at the expense of another party. The client will, to be sure,
have to pay the lawyer to undertake these “hard-ball,” “pit-bull,”
“scorched-earth” tactics. “But,” as I have argued elsewhere, “if the
client does not also have to pay either the opposing party’s legal fees
in responding to such measures or society’s costs in wasted judicial
time and general fraying of the social fabric, the client has a perverse
economic incentive to engage in tactics that no neutral observer would
believe conducive to a resolution of the case on its merits.”32
Medical care can pose parallel problems. If my physician overprescribes antibiotics to me, the super-bugs that evolve may become a
scourge to you as well.33 More generally, if someone other than the
30
See Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 705, 710–11 (1977) (“[T]he costs of dispute resolution
and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties—the social costs
involved are borne by society as a whole.”).
31
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 489 (citing “abuse of the discovery process” as
an example of “overly zealous representation of the client’s interests”).
32
Atkinson, supra note 20, at 273.
33
See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 27, at 647 (referring to the public’s interest in the efficient resolution of disputes “in circumstances where individual clients
would be willing to pay lawyers to delay or impede truth-finding processes”); Ronald
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patient pays for medical care, the doctor and patient may be tempted
to pursue more therapies than might be appropriate if benefits were
more objectively balanced against their full costs.
c.

Summary

These examples of information asymmetries and external costs all
suggest that at least some of the paradigmatic services rendered by
both lawyers and doctors are not likely to be optimally provided by
ordinary contracts between providers and consumers, lawyers and
doctors on the one hand and clients and patients on the other. In the
case of information asymmetries, providers have incentives to give
consumers less than they are paying for. In the case of externalities,
producers and consumers together tend to pass costs onto third parties
or the public. To avoid these market failures, lawyers and doctors
must be induced to deploy specialized knowledge in ways that ordinary market forces may not optimally reward.
2.

Government Failure in Regulating the
Provision of Specialized Knowledge

The standard response to these classic market failures is governmental intervention. That intervention, mapped along a spectrum
from the least intrusive to the most, includes subsidizing or penalizing
suppliers, imposing mandatory government standards, or even outright government provision of the product in question. In the context
of professional services, these regulatory measures typically include
the following: special educational requirements, to ensure that the
professionals are capable of providing the service in question; special
fiduciary duties, to ensure that the services of the requisite quality are
provided; and third-party monitoring of both training and service delivery.34 Broadly stated, these market-correcting regulatory measures
must ensure that the unqualified do not deliver services and that the
qualified deliver them as promised, at an appropriate level of quality,
and without excessive costs to either clients or third parties.35 In prinJ. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
MD. L. REV. 869, 873–77 (1990) (outlining an economic justification for “the
Rawlsian . . . prohibition of strategic litigation” contained in Model Rule 3.1).
34
Atkinson, supra note 20, at 272–73.
35
See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 220
(explaining that consumer protection is especially important when “the profession’s
skills are so complex and esoteric that lay people are not well enough informed to be
able . . . to choose the competent over the incompetent”).
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ciple, these regulatory correctives should be applied so long as their
costs are lower than the benefits gained, so long, that is, as the prescribed regimen of governmental regulation isn’t a cure more costly
than the market malfunction it is intended to correct.
Why, we have to wonder, wouldn’t these routine regulatory
measures work to correct the market failures we have identified in the
delivery of medical and legal services? Here proponents of traditional
professions like law and medicine interpose a critical objection: All
the problems with market provisions of professional services have
correlates on the government side; when we look for regulatory corrections for these particular market failures, we run into corresponding
government failures. In these cases, in other words, the regulatory
correctives generally prescribed for market failures are either unsafe
or ineffective.
All these government failures trace back to what functionalists
take to be an essential feature of genuinely professional work. The
proper use of professional knowledge includes the ability to apply
general principles or techniques to the particular case at hand, very
like what the ancients called “phronesis,” or practical wisdom.36 This
necessarily requires a large element of discretion which is, by its very
nature, difficult to cabin with bright-line, categorical rules.37 Law,
according to professionalism’s defenders, is distinctly ill-equipped to
ensure that this kind of discretion is properly exercised.
Consider, from this perspective, our earlier medical and legal examples. As we have seen, the litigating lawyer must know, not only
the substantive laws in which clients’ claims are grounded and the
procedural laws by which those claims are asserted, but also subtle,
difficult to calibrate matters such as what witnesses to call, how to
question them, when to press on and when to leave off. So, too, with
doctors in the examination and treatment of particular patients.38
Lawyers and doctors may omit some such measures because they
do not know that those measures are critical in the case at hand; if
you’ll pardon the pun, that may well have been the problem in Hawkins v. McGee. Lawyers and doctors may also omit certain essential
36
See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31;
see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 170 (1988);
SIMON, supra note 19, at 21–25 (identifying “practical reason” with his fundamental
lawyerly attribute, “contextual judgment”).
37
See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31;
SIMON, supra note 19, at 123 (“Because such services depend on technical knowledge
and resist standardization, they are not readily compatible with market or bureaucratic
organization.”).
38
GROOPMAN, supra note 2, at 5 (noting the tension in medical practice
between applying complex individual judgment and following detailed protocols).
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measures as a means of cutting costs without corresponding fee reductions, thus improperly increasing their private gains. In either case,
capturing the proper measure of effort in a mathematically precise rule
is quite problematic.39
Excessive zeal presents a parallel problem in both fields: Just as it
takes an expert to know when professional knowledge is being applied
poorly on the client’s behalf, so it takes an expert to know whether
that knowledge is being applied over-zealously, even maliciously, at
the expense of the client’s opponent or the general public. It is difficult to reduce the applicable standard to bright-line rules or protocols.
The point, for example, at which a line of appropriately probing crossexamination veers toward harassment of a witness is impossible to
specify with Euclidian clarity, even though an expert may be able to
mark it, in practice, to a single moment or to detect it in a steady but
subtle undercurrent of tone.40 So, too, it may be apparent to any medical expert which suspicious “lumps” are dark or hard or otherwise
abnormal enough to require a further battery of tests, even though
these factors may not be possible to state literally “on paper” in generally applicable protocols or guidelines.
These considerations, according to functionalist theory, make it
impossible for fungible state functionaries to measure professional
performance by standardized, bureaucratic protocols.41 Professional
practice must, instead, be evaluated by the professional cognoscenti
themselves with inevitably hazily-stated, “know it when I see it”
standards rather than “hard and fast,” bright-line rules.42 Such standards are doubly difficult: On the one hand, their very looseness leaves
lots of wiggle-room for the incompetent or unscrupulous; on the other
hand, that same vagueness may force the conscientious to be overly
39
The law has a generally effective means of addressing this problem, its
ancient and honorable default to principles of equity as a corrective to the strict letter
of the law or, in more modern terms, “standards” as an alternative to “rules.” See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559–64 (1992); see also RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 118 (2002)
(discussing the tension between a “mechanical” jurisprudence and a discretionary
one). But, as we will see later, neither the proponents of professionalism nor its detractors have fully appreciated either this possibility or its relevant limitations. See
infra Part II.B.
40
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .”).
41
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 31;
SIMON, supra note 20, at 123 (“Because such services depend on technical knowledge
and resist standardization, they are not readily compatible with market or bureaucratic
organization.”).
42
See Atkinson, supra note 20, at 325.
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cautious, doing sometimes more, sometimes less, than their best professional judgment dictates, lest they incur legal penalties.43
3.

Professional Institutions as Superior
Guarantors of Specialized Knowledge

Professional knowledge, then, poses dual problems: With their
limited grasp of matters within the special purview of professionals,
consumers cannot guarantee proper professional service through private contracts with suppliers; with its routine range of regulatory remedies, the state can neither prevent professionals from exploiting those
information asymmetries nor prevent clients and their professionals
from externalizing costs.44 These two problems bring us to professionalism’s third and final claim: Only institutions internal to the professions themselves can adequately guarantee proper acquisition and
deployment of the relevant knowledge. The cure for abuses by ignorant or unscrupulous individual practitioners, in other words, is regulation by knowledgeable and conscientious professional groups.
In the face of the two besetting sins we have identified, undercompetence (taking advantage of the clients’ relative ignorance) and
externalities, (helping clients’ externalize costs upon third parties and
the public), the professions claim to provide two distinct virtues. The
first involves placing the client’s interests above the professional’s
own; the second, placing the public interest above the interests of both
the client and the professional.45 In the words of Justice O’Connor,
“One distinguishing feature of any profession . . . is that membership
entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the market.”46
43

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 20 (2010) (“Violation of a
Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it
create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”).
44
See id.
45
See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 66 (1992) (“Good lawyers . . . must
sometimes ignore their own self-interest, or the self-interest of their clients.”); SIMON,
supra note 19, at 125 (noting that the self-regulatory regime of the “ProgressiveFunctionalist project” enforced two basic norms, which “are primarily concerned with
the adequacy of service to clients, and secondarily concerned with fairness to third
parties”); see also ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY,
AND POLICY 200 (1994) (“The character of professional work suggests two basic
elements of professionalism – commitment to practicing a body of knowledge and
skill of special value and to maintaining a fiduciary relationship with clients.”).
46
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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In functionalist theory, the organized, autonomous profession
achieves proper deployment of professional knowledge through three
basic means. First, the profession inculcates a commitment to the
core professional virtues, particularly in the course of professional
education, which it therefore needs to control.47 Second, the profession denies admission into its ranks to those lacking in the relevant
virtues, under its “character and fitness” requirements.48 Third, the
profession maintains a system of sanctions, positive and negative, that
encourages its members to practice the requisite virtues and eschew
the corresponding vices, upon pain of penalties that range from collegial reprimands to formal expulsion from the profession’s ranks.49 In
combination, these professional institutions—education, admission,
and regulation—ensure a level of performance above what consumers
could obtain from any array of private contracts or public regulations.
Or so the proponents of professionalism claim.
4.

Summary

Functionalists claim that the necessarily discretionary application
of professional knowledge presents difficulties of both ordinary market provision and routine state regulation. Relatively autonomous
professional institutions are supposed to fill this double gap with special professional virtues. We will skeptically assess that claim in Part
II; as we will see there, the claimed need for professional institutions
proves rather too little.50 The case for the superiority of professional
self-regulation over state regulation is, at best, badly focused. The
institutions of professionalism are neither necessary to guarantee the
acquisition of professional knowledge nor sufficient to guarantee the
exercise of professional virtue. Before turning to those problems with
functionalist theory, however, we need to focus on a more basic problem, in the other direction: The functionalist definition of specialized
47

FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 94–95

n.13.
48

See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491, 508 (1985).
49
See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 7 (2010) (In addition to the rules of professional conduct, “a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers.”); ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (Although the lawyer is to be guided by both the
Code and personal conscience, “in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and
confidence of members of his profession and of the society with he serves that should
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct”
and “[t]he possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”).
50
See infra Part II.
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professional knowledge tends to prove too much. Many occupations
other than the classic professions seem to involve the kind of
knowledge that requires considerable discretion in its application,
which should lead to the same kinds of market and regulatory failures.
Functionalism must thus distinguish professional services from a wide
array of services that seem to require equally esoteric knowledge and
an analogous regulatory regime.
B.

Focusing the Functionalist Thesis: Narrowing the
Field of Professional Knowledge

A complex economy involves many forms of specialized
knowledge, from computer programming to auto repair; most of us
can neither acquire that knowledge for ourselves at reasonable cost
nor adequately assess it in others. To distinguish professionals from
the wider range of those who provide these specialized knowledgebased services, scholars of the professions draw two critical lines.
The first separates artisans from technicians; the second separates
technicians from professionals. The requirement of university-based
specialized education marks the first line; the necessary combination
of university-based specialized education and university-based liberal
education marks the second. As we shall see, scholars of the professions have never drawn either line very clearly and have blurred the
second quite badly.51
1.

The Line Between Artisans and Technicians:
Distinguishing Informal from Formal
Specialized Knowledge

Functionalists concede that occupations other than professions also involve specialized knowledge, and that that knowledge, in turn,
requires a measure of discretion on the part of practitioners that is
hard to restrain with black-letter laws.52 Remember Jerry Seinfeld and
George Costanza’s despair about over-priced auto mechanics:
George: Well, of course they’re trying to screw you. What do you
think? That’s what they do. They can make up anything. Nobody
51

Notice that the line of university-based education is the one that Continental European countries tend to draw, without the further distinction of AngloAmerican law. See Torstendahl, supra note 12, at 5.
52
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 32 (“[I]t
is possible to delineate skilled work as a discretionary specialization based upon
everyday and practical, but not necessarily formal knowledge.”).
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knows. ‘By the way, you need a new Johnson rod in there.’ ‘Oh, a
Johnson rod. Yeah, well, you better put one of those on.’53

Furthermore, many non-professional services entail not only information asymmetries, but also externalities. If the providers of
these non-professional services fail, it is not just consumers who will
suffer, but also third parties, and sometimes more than in the case of
improperly performed professional work. A poorly drafted will may
cost the client’s beneficiaries a fortune in the relatively distant future;
a poor brake job on my pickup truck could easily cost both you and
me our lives, later this very afternoon. Yet we leave the latter situation to an essentially unregulated market in auto repair, reinforced
post hoc by the tort system (assuming the injured party can afford a
private lawyer). If some combination of private market and government regulation is adequate for other services that entail the application of esoteric knowledge, why not in putative professions like law
and medicine, as well?
How is putatively professional knowledge distinguishable from
other esoteric knowledge that functionalist theory does not see as requiring professional institutions? If professional knowledge isn’t distinguishable, then functionalist defenders of the professions face a
dilemma: Either, on the one hand, professionals need no more special
occupational organization than other occupations providing equally
complex and essential forms of knowledge, or, on the other hand,
many more occupations qualify as professions than functionalist theory and social practice have acknowledged. Thus functionalist theory
should either “elevate” these other knowledge-based occupations into
professional status, or reconsider the possibility that the classic professional mode of organization could be replaced by some combination of governmental and market mechanisms. Either way, the implication of this criticism is that functionalist theory proves too much.
Functionalism has answered this over-breadth critique, although,
as we shall see, that answer raises questions of its own. Functionalists
insist that the specialized knowledge of professionals is distinct from
that of artisans and technicians in several related ways. Most fundamentally, professional education requires a university foundation.54
This critical distinction is already traceable in Brandeis’s century-old
53

Seinfeld: The Fusille Jerry (NBC television broadcast Apr. 27, 1995),
script available at http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheFusilliJerry htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2012). See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 8.
54
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 123
(“The professional school is where ethics is elaborated as well as taught and where
that can be done somewhat independently of the market and the polity.”).
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outline: “A profession is an occupation for which the necessary preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and
to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill.”55 Unlike
craft training, which takes place largely in the workplace, and technical training, which “typically takes place in para-secondary and
post-secondary institutions that are sometimes called technical institutes,”56 the ideal-type professional “school is attached to institutions
of higher education.”57 What’s more, “in contrast to those involved in
both craft and technical training, the faculty of the ideal-typical professional school is expected not only to teach, but also to be active in
the codification, refinement, and expansion of the occupation’s body
of knowledge and skill by both theorizing and doing research.”58
Thus “[t]he prestige that distinguishes the professions from the crafts
stems from the connection of their training with higher education.”59
Both medicine and law readily meet this first half of functionalism’s dual test. The specialized knowledge of physicians is literally
proverbial: “The doctor’s knowledge gives him high standing and
wins him the admiration of the great.”60 Even revisionist critics of
medicine’s status as a profession concede that its practice is essentially rooted in the advance of experimental sciences after the Enlightenment. These critics cite that scientific grounding as essential to medicine’s success in obtaining and retaining a uniquely large measure of
This scientific
occupational autonomy and market control.61
knowledge is both inaccessible to laypeople and functionally related
to providing a fundamental social value—individual physical health.
And the scientific foundation of modern medical practice is itself
based in the modern research university, as opposed to technical or
occupational schools.62 As a result, medicine exhibits the kind of specialized knowledge required of an ideal-type profession.63
55

BRANDEIS, supra note 16, at 2.
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 91.
57
Id. at 92; see also LARSON, supra note 4, at 17 (“[T]he link between research and training institutionalized by the modern model of university gives to university-based professions the means to control their cognitive bases.”).
58
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 92.
59
Id. at 103. See also LARSON, supra note 9, at 3 (“But the association with
the university and, especially, the knowledge of Latin, distinguished the ‘learned’
professions from the craft guilds that developed in the towns between the eleventh
and the thirteenth century.”).
60
THE ANCHOR BIBLE: THE WISDOM OF BEN SIRA § 38:3 (Patrick W. Skehan
trans., 1987).
61
See LARSON, supra note 4, at 34, 36.
62
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 185.
63
We can take it as proved because it actually is proved or, more stingily,
because, even if it is proved, its essential link with general knowledge cannot be
56
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So, too, with the law. The need for inter-disciplinary education is
apparent, even in simple, first-year curriculum cases like Hawkins v.
McGee. At least since the time of Learned Hand’s famous standard of
negligence,64 lawyers and judges have recognized that determining
liability for non-contractual damages necessarily involves both
cost/benefit analysis and risk calculation. In more complex cases, the
interdisciplinary foundation of modern law is even more apparent.
The structuring of mass torts, for example, implicates not only economics, but also sociology, psychology, and political and moral philosophy,65 all university-based academic disciplines. These two examples come from private law; the academic foundations of public
law are even more obvious. As Judge Posner points out, “[i]t is fair to
say that at the beginning of its second century antitrust law has become a branch of applied economics . . . .”66 And so, too, “administrative law scholarship . . . draws more on economics and political
science than on law [traditionally defined].”67 Private law itself is
now seen to rest ultimately on the same foundations as public law;68
modern law, private and public, is thus thoroughly grounded in advanced, university-based studies in the social sciences and humanities.
Both doctors and lawyers, then, can be shown to need a specialized knowledge that is not only beyond the ken of layfolk, but also
grounded in the university. That grounding of both medicine and law
in the university takes care of Seinfeld and Costanza’s auto mechanic
(at least for now); knowledge of the Johnson rod may indeed be important and esoteric, and there may be a certain “zen” about all vehicular maintenance, automobile as well as motorcycle. But mechanics
do not acquire either that knowledge or that skill in college, and its
foundations do not lie in university-based research. Thus it is not
merely, as one prominent scholar of professionalism has suggested,
that “[p]eople don’t want to call automobile repair a profession because they don’t want to accord it that dignity.” 69

proved, as we shall see. Since these requirements are conjuncts, both are needed to
make the case for medicine as a proper profession; if medicine fails to meet one of
them, it fails the entire test.
64
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
65
See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and
Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 91 (2011).
66
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
229 (1999).
67
Id. at 237.
68
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN, at vii-viii (1985).
69
Cf. ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 8.
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The Line Between Technicians and Professionals: Connecting Formal Occupational
Knowledge and General Cultural Knowledge

Even as the identification of university-based education essential
to medicine and law promises to distinguish these paradigmatic professions from “crafts,” it poses another problem. It leaves a large and
growing number of occupations on the professional side of the line:
accounting, engineering, and business management, for example. As
Louis Brandeis pointed out, business management is the subject of
highly esoteric bodies of knowledge, in several quite disparate disciplines in both the physical and social sciences,70 and it is taught at the
university level.71
To distinguish such occupations as these, theorists of the professions point to a distinction traditionally drawn by the professions
themselves. Professions do not merely involve a university-based
theoretical foundation of their teachers; they also require a more
broad-based liberal education on the part of their students and practitioners. Thus, according to Freidson,
The ideology of professionalism asserts knowledge that is not
merely the narrow depth of the technician, or the shallow breadth of
a generalist, but rather a wedding of the two in a unique marriage.
This wedding of liberal education to specialized training qualifies
professionals to be more than mere technicians. It qualifies them to
serve in managerial positions where they can establish policy as
well as organize and control their own work and the work of their
colleagues independently of both managers and consumers. By
grounding a functionally specific specialization in the advanced,
elite generalism that provides executives and politicians with a
mandate to command consumers, subjects, and citizens, the professional ideology creates a basis for claiming legitimacy that goes beyond the technical.72

And this elite generalism, according to Friedson, “provides or requires prior exposure to high culture.”73
But outlining the basis for professions’ claim to a kind of esoteric
knowledge above the merely technical simply raises another question:
Is that foundation substantial enough to sustain the edifice that has
70

BRANDEIS, supra note 16, at 2–3.
See id. at 1 (“The establishment of business schools in our universities is a
manifestation of the modern conception of business [as a profession].”).
72
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 121.
73
Id.
71
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been erected upon it? To put the question in functionalism’s own
terms: Is this university-based training in the liberal arts as well as in a
particular occupational specialty functionally related to professionals’
performance of their socially necessary and knowledge-based tasks?
Revisionist critics of functionalism have a ready response: no.
Liberal education of professionals is a pseudo-necessity, either another costly and artificial barrier to entry,74 or simply a high-status consumption item or social ornament.75 The real function of the requirement is thus to dominate the market for certain services, either by
restricting supply of qualified practitioners or by creating demand for
what amounts to little more than mystifying pseudo-science.76 As
even the leading defender of professionalism concedes, the professions may cloak themselves in the status-enhancing allure of university education because it associates them, in various ways, with powerful elites.77
To answer these criticisms and defensibly distinguish the professions from other occupations that rely on university-based technical
74
See, e.g., FRITZ K. RINGER, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN MODERN EUROPE
21 (1979) (“[T]he ability to do without any particular competence was clearly honorific . . . suggest[ing] the power to direct others, as against having to be useful and
usable oneself.”); RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 189 (1979) (“It has been by the use of
educational credentials that the lucrative professions have closed their ranks and
upgraded their salaries, and it has been in imitation of their methods that other occupations have ‘professionalized.’”); LARSON, supra note 4, at 87 (“Social qualifications
became the first requirement for membership, and it was held that the necessary
‘morals and manners’ could be learnt only at the universities.”) (quoting A.M. CARRSAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 71 (1933)). Id. at 89 (“The classics . . .
served the professions in a different way: as the intellectual sanction which Oxford
and Cambridge bestowed upon the gentry’s hegemony, a classical education functioned as a gate-keeping mechanism for the most prestigious professional roles.”); see
also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (finding it inappropriate to
require higher education of employees when their job performance does not require
that education and when that requirement tends to exclude minority applicants).
75
See COLLINS, supra note 74, at vii (“‘The old requirements of a knightly
style of life . . . is nowadays in Germany replaced by the necessity of participating in
its surviving remnants, the dueling fraternities of the universities which grant the
patents of education; in the Anglo-Saxon countries by the athletic and social clubs
that fulfill the same function.’”) (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY, VOLUME 2, at 1000 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich, eds., University of California Press 1978)).
76
See LARSON, supra note 4, at 48; Abel, supra note 14, at 187.
77
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 103–04.
See also ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 137 (describing the professional strategy of “drawing power from without” though “alliance with a particular social class, a strategy
usually preferred by elite professions”: “In such a case, a profession draws both its
recruits and its clients from the upper classes, locates its training in the elite universities or similar settings, and affects an ethic of stringent gentlemanliness.”).
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knowledge, proponents of professionalism must establish a necessary
link between technical professional knowledge and a university-level
education in the liberal arts. This case, we shall see in the next section, can be made for the practice of law, but the case for the practice
of medicine is a very different matter.
C.

Finding the Crucial Link with Liberal Learning

To distinguish the professions from other occupations that deploy
university-based bodies of knowledge, functionalist sociologists have
identified an additional kind of knowledge that professionals need: the
kind of generalist knowledge associated with a liberal, not just a university, education. As we have seen, however, functionalism has been
more than a little vague about what this link is, and what function it
serves. Without more precision on this point, functionalism leaves
itself open to the revisionist charge that this asserted link is really a
distinction without a difference, a makeweight that serves the interest
of the occupation rather than its consumers or the public.
Into that gap in functionalist theory this section brings both good
news and bad. The good news is that a closer analysis of the legal
profession shows that it entails exactly the kind of hybrid general and
specialized knowledge that functionalism is looking for. The bad
news is that no such link is to be found in the practice of medicine.
We begin, accordingly, by considering law as a paradigm of this kind
of knowledge, the better to notice its apparent absence in the practice
of medicine.
1.

The Law and Liberal Learning

To see why lawyers need this special hybrid knowledge, let’s reconsider our medical malpractice example. We noticed that the
standard of tort liability, as currently understood in the law, implicates
the kind of economic analysis that is based in university economics
departments.78 This link and others like it, according to functionalist
theory, distinguishes the lawyer’s specialized knowledge from that of
the automobile mechanic or even the master artisan.
It does not, however, distinguish lawyers from actuaries.79 Their
grounding in university-based economic theory is at least as clear as
that of lawyers; quite likely, the typical actuary will need a much
more sophisticated appreciation of economics than the average law78

See supra Part I.A.
See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 235–38 (examining the partial professionalization of statisticians, quality controllers, and operations researchers).
79
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yer. Thus, the critical distinction between actuaries and lawyers must
lie elsewhere. On the functionalist argument, it lies in the lawyer’s
wedding of specialized, university-based knowledge with general,
liberal learning.
And so, indeed, it does. This linkage becomes clear if we imagine
the aftermath of the Hawkins case from the perspective of a lawyer
representing Dr. McGee’s malpractice insurance carrier. Suppose
that, having lost the Hawkins case under the existing standard of care,
the medical malpractice insurer asks for help dealing with a more
general problem: burgeoning medical malpractice claims. What the
insurance company wants now, in other words, is “tort reform.”
Although this issue could have come up in the trial itself,80 the
setting for seeking such legal change would more likely be either administrative or legislative.81 More ambitiously, the insurance company might seek federal preemption of state standards or some other
sweeping “tort reform” plan; more mundanely, it might merely apply
for an increase in permitted premiums to cover expanding liability
under the existing regime.
At each of these levels, one thing is clear: the lawyer’s argument
for the insurance company cannot be that the proposed change is good
for just that company, or for the insurance industry as a whole, or
even for American companies generally. The insurance company
must argue that its proposal is good for society at large. So it was
with all the recent bail-outs: the banks, GM and the automobile industry, and AIG.82 Corporate lawyers cannot prevail in these settings
based on corporate profitability or even broader business interests.
They must invoke some other standard because the relevant decisionmakers—legislatures, administrative agencies, and ultimately the

80

Dr. Hawkins’s lawyer could have argued, not that the doctor’s particular
level of care was appropriate, but that the level of care itself was inappropriate. This
is not, however, a particularly flattering portrayal of the doctor himself, nor is it likely
to be his best defense.
81
This is not to deny, of course, that “test cases” are both an important and
legitimate instrument for legal change. See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights
Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L.
REV. 795, 837 (1989); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010); FED. R. CIV.
P. 11 (recognizing the legitimacy of litigation based on arguments for the modification, extension, or reversal of existing law).
82
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008) (“To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and
insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers,
and for other purposes.”).
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courts—have protection of the public interest as their constitutional
mission.83
This is the central point: to argue for any change in the law, the
insurance company’s lawyers, qua lawyers, must engage in the discourse of public interest, as distinct from their client’s particular interests. The lawyer cannot simply argue that the change in law would be
good for the client; the lawyer must also argue that the change in law
would be good for the public as well. To serve their client’s interest,
the insurance company’s lawyers must be able to speak in terms that
transcend both what is technically legal under current law and what is
in the client’s own interest.
This brings us to the larger point. Law is ultimately grounded in
claims of justice, and justice invariably involves resolving conflicts of
particular interests consistently with the public interest. Law’s origin
as a profession precisely coincided with the need of European monarchs for just such an occupation and the offering of legal training in
the earliest European universities (with England as a notable exception).84 As a matter of basic competence, then, at least some lawyers
must know how to make public-benefit based arguments.85
Thus, when we examine a basic element of the lawyer’s role—
arguing on behalf of private clients for changes in the law—we discover that they need precisely the combination of technical and general knowledge that functionalists say the ideal-type profession re83

This is reflected, perhaps most basically, in the minimum scrutiny applied
to garden-variety economic and social legislation after United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938): All legislation must at least offer a minimally reasonable prospect of advancing a legitimate state interest.
84
No one makes this point better than Larson, hardly an apologist for the
traditional claims of professionalism:
In continental Europe, the development and the codification of the law had
coincided with the multiplication of the universities in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. In Italy especially, but also in some French universities, the demand for lawyers and administrators led to notable developments in civil and canon law. In England, the civil courts had resisted the
introduction of the Roman Code and created, instead, a native common
law, considered much too coarse and plebeian to be a fit subject of university teaching.
LARSON, supra note 4, at 85 (citation omitted).
85
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 13 (2010) (“Lawyers [as guardians of the law] play a vital role in the preservation of society. The
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship [with
and function in] our legal system.”). The bracketed language is from the otherwise
identical provision of the Preamble of the A.B.A.’s 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980).
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quires. In order to argue for changes in the law that are in their clients’ interests, they must be able to make the case that those changes
are in the public interest, too, that what is good for GM really is good
for the country. And, in order to make these arguments, they must be
able to identify and balance core social values. On this process rests
the legal profession’s best claim to require a foundation of universitylevel liberal learning. Here we have an account that both links the
technical with the liberal arts in legal education and shows how the
practice of law necessarily implicates that link.
2.

The Missing Link Between the Practice of
Medicine and the Application of Liberal
Learning

In Part I.A, we saw that the essential element of an ideal-type profession is provision of a service that, on account of the specialized
knowledge it entails, must be regulated by an essentially autonomous
occupation. In Part I.B, we saw that that the specialized knowledge
that distinguishes professions from other knowledge-based occupations must be generated and conveyed in a research-oriented university and must be functionally related to the kind of general knowledge
included in a liberal arts education. The practice of law, we saw in
Part I.C.1, offers a paradigm of just this sort of knowledge-based occupation. By contrast, as we shall see in the rest of Part I.C, the practice of medicine, long the paradigmatic learned profession, lacks precisely the link between technical knowledge and liberal education
needed to make a profession “learned” in the relevant way.
As a start, let’s compare the role of medical and legal experts in
the example that we just considered, changing the standard of care
relevant to doctors. Doctors’ specialized knowledge would, of course,
be essential to making that case. Only medical experts could supply
necessary data about what results various procedures are likely to produce, at what costs, and at what risks. But those are only the empirical predicates to answering the ultimate question, what the appropriate
standard of care should be. Actually answering that question involves
not just knowing what to do to achieve a particular result, but also
whether the cost of doing that is warranted when compared with other
considerations. It is making the case for just such decisions that requires lawyers to rely, not only on a specialized knowledge of law as a
body of rules and procedures, but also on the kind of general appreciation of social values that is the core of both a liberal arts education and
law understood more broadly as a system for the rational resolution of
disputes over just such values—law understood as judges understand
it, as a “system of justice.”
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As we have seen, competent delivery of a wide range of legal services requires just such knowledge; lawyers must be able to ground
client claims in the public interest. To do this, they must be able to
articulate the shared values that are said to form the public interest.
Knowledge of these shared values can only be obtained from a liberal
education.
By contrast, it is difficult to see why a medical doctor would need
a deep appreciation of such values in order to deliver competent medical care. Doctors, to be sure, need to know that health is a value, but
they could presumably either infer the value of health from the fact
that consumers are willing and able to pay for it or accept its value as
a “given” of our legal and social systems more generally. With respect to other social values, doctors need know even less. The Hippocratic Oath itself implies that all doctors need to know about other
values is that doctors are always to subordinate the pursuit of those
values to that of the individual patient’s health.86 Someone, of course,
needs to know why this subordination is appropriate, but it need not
include all doctors (and could conceivably include no doctors). By
contrast, to the extent that this subordination is legally binding, part of
the minimally acceptable level of medical care, at least some lawyers
would need to understand it: those who would effectively argue that
the client-first standard has been met in a particular case, or needs to
be changed across the board.
And we can see this same distinction between doctors and lawyers
much more broadly, in the general debate over how health care is to
be weighed against other social values. In a purely market economy,
consumers alone would decide how to weigh health care against other
social values. They would budget for health care according to two
considerations, willingness and ability to pay: how much they could
afford to pay for that service, and how much they value it relative to
other goods and services they might purchase instead. In this purely
laissez-faire system, doctors would certainly convey esoteric information to consumers about how healthy they are, and what they would
need to stay that healthy or get healthier. That would be the essence
of the service they provide; they would fail to provide it at peril of
malpractice liability, loss of licensure, and other legal penalties.
But the doctor’s service would include no essential role—and, unless asked, perhaps no proper role—in advising patients whether to
value a given level of health higher or lower than anything else (e.g., a
given level of pastry or tobacco consumption or, for that matter, dona86
Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today html.
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tions for the benefit of those who cannot afford basic health care).
This is emphatically not to say that social values are not in the balance
when one decides whether to undergo a tummy-tuck or send one’s
plastic surgeon off to a Third World country to mend a child’s cleft
palate. It is just to say that, in weighing these alternatives, the opinion
of one’s doctor, as a doctor, is professionally irrelevant. Or, to put the
point a bit more precisely, the opinion of one’s doctor could be made
irrelevant, legally or functionally, without undermining that doctor’s
delivery of optimal medical care.
No modern health-care system, of course, operates on so purely a
market model, with medical services allocated strictly on the basis of
individual patients’ willingness and ability to pay. We not only regulate to ensure that patients get the kind of treatment they are paying
for, we also redistribute wealth, in various ways, to make sure that
some people receive at least some treatments they want but cannot
afford.87 And the law sometimes intrudes even more into individuals’
consumption of medical care, by overriding an unwillingness to pay.
The government sometimes mandates that people receive medical care
that they can readily afford but would emphatically refuse. The paradigm of this today, of course, is mandatory vaccination;88 not too long
ago, it was mandatory sterilization.89 And, conversely, the law sometimes forbids medical procedures that some are willing and able to
pay for: extremely late-term abortions today;90 virtually all abortions
in the recent past91 (and, perhaps, in the near future).92
All these examples, of course, involve the weighing of health-care
costs and benefits against each other and against competing social
87
Medicaid and Medicare are, of course, the prime American examples;
some countries have much more extensively subsidized health-care provision. See
EINER ELHAUGE, THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE 3–4 (2010).
88
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–27 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–70 (1944).
89
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
90
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 541 (1989) (“[T]he
State may not fully regulate abortion in the interest of potential life (as opposed to
maternal health) until the third trimester . . . .”).
91
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973) (listing the following states as
having laws limiting abortions: Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming).
92
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(stating that the ruling upholding the partial-birth abortion ban was an “alarming” one
that ignored Supreme Court precedent and “refuse[d] to take Casey and Stenberg
seriously”).
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values. And all these examples necessarily implicate knowledge that
only the medically trained can provide: the technical feasibility of
various therapies and procedures, perhaps the relative costs and effectiveness of various alternatives. But, once that data is in, we do not
need doctors, qua doctors, to help us weigh it. That balancing of values is not, strictly speaking, a medical decision. It will, by contrast,
always be a legal decision: what to fund, what to allow, what to require, what to forbid.
Consider a recent but already classic case, the much-discussed
“death panels” of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act.93 The
function of those panels, contrary to the rumors, was not to decide
whether to save particular individuals or to let them die. Instead, their
function was to give the terminally ill the basis on which to make an
informed decision about whether or not to elect potentially lifeprolonging treatment. On any such panel, doctors would surely have
a place, to explain what the relevant treatment options were, in terms
of their likely success, side-effects, quality of life, and costs. Someone other than a doctor might deliver that information, but its ultimate
source would have to be someone trained in the science of medicine
itself. But, to the extent that the patient wanted to know what he or
she should do, whether he or she should elect a given therapy or any
treatment option at all, the doctor, qua doctor, need have no role.
Such counseling could be given by someone specially trained to
weigh such values, quite possibly someone of the patient’s own religious or political faith. That person would be, in essence, a kind of
chaplain; that kind of chaplain need not be any kind of medical doctor.
The same is potentially true, if less politically dramatic, in the
case of all end of life decisions. The law has long since removed
these decisions from the unilateral discretion of doctors; doctors now
“play God” in that sense only at the peril of malpractice liability, loss
of licensure, or even conviction for homicide.94 The role of the doctor, qua doctor, is now to diagnose terminal illness, inform the patient,
and identify possible modes of treatment. But the choice of treatment,
though often not the patient’s alone, need never be the doctor’s at
all.95 You can, of course, ask your doctor for his or her opinion about
whether you should pursue a life-extending course of treatment, but
that opinion would be personal, not professional. Again, we can
93
See Robert Pear, Obama Institutes End-of-Life Plan that Caused Stir, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at A1.
94
People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
consent and euthanasia were not viable defenses in Kevorkian’s murder prosecution).
95
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 318–19.
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structure the delivery of health care in a way that makes the doctor’s
rendering of that opinion unnecessary to the delivery of medical care.
Nor is this distinction merely theoretical; the Supreme Court’s
abortion cases have effectively written it into constitutional law. To
see how this is so, consider two landmark Supreme Court cases, Roe
v. Wade96 and Rust v. Sullivan.97 The former, of course, affirmed a
woman’s basic constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy with a
doctor’s assistance. The latter upheld a federal regulation that forbids
doctors in federally-funded family planning clinics from giving advice
about non-therapeutic abortions. Opponents of the regulatory prohibition argued that it unconstitutionally interferes with patients’ right to
have non-therapeutic abortions, in effect overturning Roe v. Wade. In
analyzing this challenge, the members of the court isolated a distinction at the core of our analysis: therapeutic as opposed to nontherapeutic advice.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, nicely set out the critical premises of
the challenge to the regulatory ban: “In our society, the doctor-patient
dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust. The specialized
nature of medical science and the emotional distress often attendant to
health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete
confidence, and often their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals.”98
This, as we shall examine in detail later, eloquently states the core
of the case for medicine as a caring profession.99 As Blackmun
points out, the majority itself was careful to note that the regulation in
question did not impinge upon doctors’ delivery of health-related advice, specifically, advice about therapeutic abortions.100 And both
Blackmun and the majority noted that earlier Supreme Court decisions
had struck down laws forbidding all doctors to discuss abortions even
in cases where the patient’s physical health was at stake.101
But Justice Blackmun’s next assertion, which tried to link protected therapeutic advice with the non-therapeutic advice at issue in Rust,
is a normative non sequitur that the majority refused to write into constitutional law: “One seeks a physician’s aid not only for medication
or diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional judgment, and vital
emotional support. Accordingly, each of us attaches profound im-

96
97
98
99
100
101

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
500 U.S. 173 (1990).
Id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See infra Part II.A.2.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988).

2013]

MEDICINE AND LAW AS MODEL PROFESSIONS

381

portance and authority to the words of advice spoken by the physician.”102
As an empirical matter, this second assertion may well be true;
many of us may often rely on our doctors for just such non-medical
advice. But this latter form of advice can be separated, both logically
and legally, from advice that is purely diagnostic and therapeutic.
That separation, in essence, is precisely what the Supreme Court majority recognized in upholding the regulation: the Constitution protects
therapeutic advice about abortions much more strongly than nontherapeutic advice.
We do not know, except along that rather extreme frontier, how
the constitutional rights of patients shape the content of the doctorpatient relationship. But we do know enough to make several important observations. First, both the Rust majority and Blackmun’s
dissent treat the diagnostic and therapeutic function of doctors as very
socially significant; in the case of pregnant women, that function is so
closely related to a fundamental legal right as to enjoy constitutional
protection. Second, the majority in Rust was unwilling to extend that
constitutional protection, on the facts before it, to doctors’ more general, non-therapeutic counseling, even when that counseling would
involve discussions of the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right, reproductive autonomy. Third, in deciding what elements of the
doctor-patient relationship are subject to legislative regulation, and to
what extent, it is members of the legal profession, not the medical
profession, who decide.
Again, in making decisions like these, members of the legal profession—not only judges, but also the lawyers who prepare such cases—must be able to draw on the most basic sources of our shared social values. And so in Roe v. Wade itself, Blackmun, writing then for
the Court’s majority, reviewed the history of abortion in Western culture all the way back to the classics and the scriptures.103 Nothing
could more nicely make the point we need to see here. The Supreme
Court recognizes the importance of the service that doctors alone have
the knowledge to provide. But protection of the right to receive what
doctors alone can provide is conferred only by our courts, and only on
the basis of their knowledge of the deepest norms of our culture.
Having an abortion may sometimes literally save a woman’s life,
as a medical matter; having either an abortion or a baby may very well
ruin her life, as a moral or psychological matter. Roe forbids the
elected branches of government from depriving a woman of medical
102
103

Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–36 (1973).
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advice, even medical assistance, in the first matter; Rust allows those
branches to deny her medical advice on the second matter when that
advice would be publicly funded. The point for us to see is, again,
that therapeutic and non-therapeutic advice about even the most fundamental medical matters can be, and often are, separated, in law as
well as in logic.
Consider a possible exception that helps clarify, if not prove, that
rule: weighing an individual patient’s good against public cost, especially where that cost is being borne by third parties. Let’s assume
that we want doctors to make these calls in individual cases, under
more or less strict guidelines. What they would need to know is the
reason for the balancing, not the public good more broadly conceived.
They might need to know how to strike the balance between benefits
and costs to individual patients, on the one hand, and the benefits and
costs to the public, on the other. But they would not need to know,
beyond that, how these balances are struck, or why. They would not
need to know, for example, the classic debates over the good of the
few versus the good of the many.104 These decisions are, ultimately,
for the popular branches of government, subject to constitutional review by the courts.
As the examples in this section remind us, many decisions about
health care, public as well as private, implicate the most profound
balancing of social values we can imagine: who we as a society decide
to save by providing subsidized health care, and who we are willing to
watch die without it; whose most profoundly held religious beliefs
must yield to the interests of others and to the common good. But
neither these value choices nor advice about how to make them is part
of the services that physicians, as physicians, provide. Although we
must look to doctors for the technical medical expertise necessary for
making all these decisions, we do not need to look to doctors for the
weighing of social values in any of these decisions. What is more, it
is not clear why we would ever need doctors, in the delivery of routine
health-care services, to appreciate fundamental social values or to help
us resolve conflicts among them. And so it seems that the asserted
link between specialized medical knowledge and a general liberal
education is, at best, not proved.
If so, then the practice of medicine cannot be, as it is generally assumed to be, the prime example of the ideal-type profession, an occupation that essentially weds specialized technical knowledge with
general cultural knowledge in the provision of an essential social ser104
See J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AGAINST 30–31 (1973).
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vice. If medicine is to sustain its claim to a distinctive professional
status, it must rest that claim on something else. As we shall see in
Part II, it has just such a claim, founded on the particular kind of care
we need doctors to take when they apply their specialized occupational knowledge in serving patients. What is more, recognition of that
claim points to a significant refinement in our understanding, not only
of medicine as a profession, but also of professions more generally.
II.

TOWARD A REFINED FUNCTIONALIST UNDERSTANDING OF
PROFESSIONALISM

This Part takes up the two basic questions posed in Part I: What, if
anything, makes the practice of medicine a profession, and what effect
does relocating the basis of professionalism in medicine have on our
understanding of professionalism generally? To get at the first question, Part II.A begins by looking back at what makes law distinctive.
It is not, we shall see, law’s distinctive kind of knowledge alone, but
rather the failure of the market to deliver that knowledge optimally,
even with regulatory correctives. With that insight, we can then isolate a similar distinction about medicine. The state and the market can
guarantee the necessary knowledge; what they cannot guarantee is the
professional virtue necessary to apply that knowledge optimally. For
that, we need the special institutions of the professions themselves.
When we turn to those institutions in Part II.B, however, we discover a paradox for both law and medicine: The very kind of virtue
we need to ensure proper delivery of professional knowledge in both
occupations cannot be guaranteed by professional institutions as traditionally conceived. Those institutions critically rely upon the coercive
power of the state to exclude from the market those practitioners lacking the relevant professional attributes. But the kind of professional
virtues we identify as essential attributes of law and medicine, respectively, cannot be regulated by the rules of professions any better than
by the laws of the state. When the professions try to root out professional vices with the coercive power of law, they run into the same
problems as government regulators.
These two insights—the unique importance of the virtue of care in
medical practice and the difficulty of ensuring that virtue—take us in
Part II.C to a refined understanding of what conditions make professions necessary, and how the professions might meet those conditions.
And that understanding gives us a new ideal-type profession with two
distinctive branches, the public professions like law and the caring
professions like medicine.
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Professional Knowledge and Professional Virtue:
Re-Mapping Their Proper Relationship

We saw in Part I that the practice of law, unlike the practice of
medicine, requires general knowledge of the public good as well as
particular occupational knowledge. From this it is tempting to draw
two related conclusions, both deeply erroneous: first, that this hybrid
knowledge is somehow the essence of professional status; second, that
requiring this knowledge makes law a proper profession, even as medicine’s lacking it means that medicine is not. A closer look at the legal profession’s hybrid of general and specialized knowledge will
point us to the common factor that makes both medicine and law
proper professions, although of significantly different kinds.
1.

The Locus of Virtue in Public-Protecting
Professions

Let’s return, then, to our examples of why lawyers must deploy
general knowledge of the public good as well as the technical
knowledge of their particular occupation.105 Those examples showed
that, to make the case for legal changes favoring their clients—
bailouts for banks and automobile companies, more favorable liability
rules for medical insurance providers—lawyers have to be able to
argue that these changes would benefit the public as well as their clients. Lawyers, again, have to lend at least plausibility to the claim
that what’s good for GM is good for the country.
Here we need to notice something else about that lawyerly deployment of general and special knowledge on behalf of private clients: It may very well be possible to guarantee its deployment to the
satisfaction of those clients themselves without any need for special
professional institutions. That knowledge is, as we have seen, quite
outside the scope of the ordinary consumer, and lawyers, left to their
own devices, might well exploit this information asymmetry. But, we
should note here, corporate managers are not ordinary consumers;
some of them are lawyers themselves. Thus the esoteric knowledge of
lawyers may be well within the scope of their corporate clients, whose
management includes lawyers like the ones they are hiring. Indeed, a
principal function of in-house counsel today is to select and monitor
effective outside counsel.106 And, of course, in-house counsel and
105

See supra Part I.C.1.
See Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011).
106
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their corporate employers have every incentive to hire lawyers with
the requisite knowledge.
On the other hand, not all lawyers who must make publicregarding arguments on behalf of private clients work for sophisticated corporate managers. Some work for individual clients who may
well not be in a position to determine whether their lawyers have this
knowledge, or whether they are deploying it as they should. Think,
again, of the plaintiffs in Hawkins v. McGee and Roe v. Wade. Here
the risk of lawyers’ exploiting information asymmetries is very real.
It is not clear, however, why the state could not mandate that lawyers
have this knowledge as a condition of being licensed and police their
application of this knowledge in practice.
We need not answer that question here;107 what we need to see
now is how different matters stand with respect to another problem
lawyerly knowledge presents, that of externalities. In both of the situations we have re-examined thus far, those involving sophisticated as
well as unsophisticated clients, we have focused only on information
asymmetries, the clients’ difficulty in ensuring that the lawyer does
not trade on superior knowledge to underserve the client. Even if
standard regulatory measures could address that problem, that would
leave another, analytically distinct problem, which we identified earlier: excessive zeal.108
Here, remember, the problem is not doing too little for a client,
but doing too much; not the lawyer’s exploiting the unknowing client,
but the lawyer’s advancing client interests at the expense of third parties or the public. Preventing this, I have argued elsewhere,109 is beyond the capacity of both the state and the market. The market actually exacerbates the problem; more knowing clients are all too eager to
reward lawyers who subordinate the public interest to particular client
interests. And the regulatory regime of the state cannot adequately
address this, since it involves mandating a commitment to the public
good that would be difficult to define and impossible to police, if not
unconstitutional to impose.
The point to see for present purposes is this: What makes a lawyer’s necessary knowledge special is not content alone—its distinctive
combination of general and specialized knowledge—but also the difficulty of ensuring the optimal deployment of that knowledge by any
combination of market and state mechanisms. If we focus on the differences between lawyerly knowledge and medical knowledge, we
risk overlooking the possibility that the two occupations share a much
107
108
109

I have examined it in detail elsewhere. See Atkinson, supra note 6.
See supra Part I.A.1.b.ii.
Atkinson, supra note 6.
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more significant similarity. There may well be aspects of medical
knowledge that make its delivery, like the delivery of legal
knowledge, impossible for the market and the state adequately to
guarantee.
2.

The Locus of Virtue in Principal-Protecting
Professions

Here again, Justice Blackmun’s sketch of the doctor-patient relationship is particularly instructive. As we saw in Part I, that sketch
nicely distinguishes between the physician’s therapeutic and counseling roles.110 There we saw that the counseling role, the role that might
well entail liberal learning, can be separated, both functionally and
analytically, from the physician’s therapeutic role. Here we need to
focus on what Justice Blackmun says about the therapeutic role itself,
the role that we have identified as the core of the physician’s function:
“In our society, the doctor-patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the
emotional distress often attendant to health-related decisions requires
that patients place their complete confidence, and often their very
lives, in the hands of medical professionals.”111
As Justice Blackmun suggests, what is distinctive about the practice of medicine is less the esoteric content of medical knowledge, and
more the configuration of factors that shape its delivery. 112
As we have seen, the practice of medicine requires knowledge
that is doubly removed from the everyday: it is not only beyond the
ken of those for whom it is applied, it is also advanced and transmitted
in research universities.113 Application of this knowledge thus creates
an information asymmetry that practitioners could abuse, and, because
application of this knowledge also involves the exercise of judgment
in complex situations, it is difficult to monitor by bureaucratic protocols. But, as we have also seen, these conditions apply to the technical work of many occupations not traditionally recognized as professions. What (if anything) makes medicine functionally different?114
110

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
112
See JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE 49 (2007) (noting that Justice Blackmun
had served as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic and retained a very high regard for
medical doctors); see also THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 27 (11th ed. 2011) (“Blackmun said that if he had his life to live over
again, he would like to be a medical doctor.”).
113
See supra Part I.A.1.a.
114
Several factors make medicine historically different, in particular its relatively early reliance on modern physical science. See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 189
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It is the importance of care; care lies at the foundation of Justice
Blackmun’s “unique relationship of trust.”115 Three critically related
elements require this kind of caring relationship: (1) the significance
of the values served, (2) the circumstances under which that service is
rendered, and (3) the inadequacy of remedies for mistakes in that service. First, the values medicine serves, health and life itself, are profoundly important to us, both as individuals and as a society.116 Second, medicine typically serves those values when we as recipients
are extremely sensitive to their importance, our need, and our vulnerability. In the paradigmatic situation of medical care even today, doctors address our health when we are sick or injured and thus both
helpless and vulnerable and, as a result, often acutely aware of our
neediness. And the third factor compounds these first two. The cost
of our doctor getting it wrong is, from our individual perspective, virtually infinite and absolutely irreversible: one mistake can kill us, and
nothing can bring us back. It is, accordingly, extremely important to
us as patients that doctors deliver their service right “the first time
‘round.” Initial mistakes would inflict a huge loss on the individual
patient, loss of life itself, and this loss cannot adequately be restored
post hoc.
The practice of medicine, then, puts at risk a value of the highest
order, life itself, under circumstances when those in need of proper
performance feel most vulnerable to an infinite and irremediable loss.
Not surprisingly, we urgently want our doctors to be supremely careful under these circumstances. More specifically, we need doctors to
be more careful than either the gain-loss calculus of the market or the
reward/penalty structure of the law can induce them to be. We need
people dedicated to, and adequately prepared for, giving the kind of
care that our health and life depend upon; we want them to treat us as
they would want themselves to be treated, as if they loved us as much
as they love themselves and those to whom they are closest. When
(“The most familiar example of the shift to scientific legitimacy claims is that of
nineteenth-century medicine.”). LARSON, supra note 4, at 37.
115
The appropriate level of interpersonal care is not only a matter of fundamental concern to the law and other normative disciplines; a proper understanding of
care may also have the most profound implications for ontology well. See MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 225–69 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans.,
Harper Row, 1962), especially Part VI, Care as the Being of Da-Sein (grounding a
phenomenology of being on a careful analysis of care, or sorge in the original German).
116
FREIDSON, THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 161 (“There are a few disciplines
whose tasks bear on issues of widespread interest and deep concern on the part of the
general population. These might be called core disciplines, bodies of knowledge and
skill which address perennial problems that are of great importance to most of humanity.”).
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what you feel you need is love, or something very like it, you’re not
likely to be satisfied with either the letter of the law or the standards
of the market. In the justly famous words of Dr. Francis Weld Peabody of the Harvard Medical School, “The secret of the care of the
patient is in caring for the patient.”117 This is also what makes medicine the paradigm of the caring professions.
3.

Summary

The traditional theory of the professions led us, in Part I, to focus
on a salient difference between medicine and law: the practice of law
requires a knowledge of the public good that the practice of medicine
does not. In this Part, we have seen why it would be wrong to conclude that, for want of that kind of knowledge, medicine is not a proper profession. Looking beneath that difference, we found a more
basic similarity: proper delivery of the specialized knowledge peculiar to medicine, every bit as much as the hybrid of special and general
knowledge necessary for law, cannot be ensured to our satisfaction by
the market or the state. To operate optimally, both occupations require, beyond those mechanisms, a distinctive professional virtue.
In the case of law, that virtue is commitment to the public good,
sometimes against the interest of private clients; in the case of medicine, that virtue is single-minded devotion to the physical well-being
of individual patients, to the exclusion of all other otherwise relevant
considerations. The virtues of the two professions differ, even as
their distinctive occupational knowledge differs. What the two occupations have in common—and what makes them both professions—is
the need for a distinctive professional virtue, a disposition in the delivery of knowledge-based services that neither the market nor the
state can adequately ensure.
Fully to appreciate the importance of this common ground, we
need to turn to the third element of the standard definition of the professions. That element is the claim that, in the face of certain kinds of
market and government failures, the institutions of professionalism
offer a superior guarantor of the proper application of specialized
knowledge; that guarantor is, in a word, virtue. As we shall see, this
may indeed be true, but not in the way that traditional theory has
maintained.

117
GROOPMAN, supra note 2 (quoting textual language as “one of the most
celebrated statements in clinical medicine”).
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Professional Virtues and Professional Institutions:
Re-Mapping the Boundaries Between the
Professions, the Market, and the State

In the face of market and regulatory failure, the institutions of
professionalism are supposed to offer a solution. That solution, in a
word (an admittedly old-fashioned word), is virtue. Recall the words
of Justice O’Connor, “One distinguishing feature of any profession . .
. is that membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct
that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline
of the market.”118 In the face of the two distinct vices we have identified—taking advantage of the clients’ relative ignorance and externalizing costs upon third parties and the public, and the failure of both
the market and the state adequately to police these vices—the professions plausibly claim to provide two distinct virtues. The first is the
virtue of professions like medicine; it places the client’s interests
above the professional’s own. The second virtue is that of professions
like law; it places the public interest above the interests of both the
client and the professional.119 The common aim of these virtues is to
ensure proper application of each profession’s distinctive knowledge.
The need for professional virtue brings us back to the basic affirmative proposition of the functionalist theory of the professions:
autonomous professional institutions correct both market and government failure in the delivery of specialized professional knowledge.
As we have seen, the professions claim to inculcate these virtues in
the course of professional education, screen for them at the point of
admission to practice, and ensure their application in the course of
professional practice. The bottom line is this: if an aspiring member
of the profession does not manifest the relevant virtue, the profession
will deny admission into its ranks; if members of the profession do
not manifest the relevant virtue in practice, the profession will expel
them.
I have argued elsewhere that, with respect to the practice of law,
the claimed superiority of professional institutions poses an inescapable double paradox: autonomous professional institutions with legal
118
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
119
See Edwards, supra note 45, at 66 (“Good lawyers . . . must sometimes
ignore their own self-interest, or the self-interest of their clients.”). SIMON, supra note
19, at 125 (noting that the self-regulatory regime of the “Progressive-Functionalist
project” enforced two basic norms, which “are primarily concerned with the adequacy
of service to clients, and secondarily concerned with fairness to third parties”).
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control of educating and regulating their members are neither necessary to guarantee distinctly professional knowledge nor sufficient to
guarantee distinctly professional virtue.120 On the contrary, on both
counts: the state can quite adequately guarantee the required
knowledge, and professional institutions cannot apply legal coercion
to ensure the necessary professional virtues.
We cannot fully rehearse the arguments for those two conclusions
here, but we do need to recapitulate them in enough detail to clarify
critical parallels with the practice of medicine. Let’s begin with the
most basic, the argument that instrumentalities of the state can adequately guarantee that members of the profession acquire the requisite
university-level knowledge. Appreciation of this knowledge may, ex
hypothesi, require someone who has had that kind of training. But it
does not follow that this expert need act on behalf of an autonomous
professional body. He or she could just as well be an agent of the
state.
The current licensing regime for both law and medicine lends
considerable support to this argument. In order to practice either, an
applicant must first pass an examination promulgated by an instrumentality of the state, medical boards in the case of medicine, the state
supreme court in the case of law. The refutation of the claim that
screening for the requisite knowledge must be in the hands of an autonomous professional body is simple: It is not in the hands of any
such body now, in the case of either law or medicine.121
What, then, of the other claim, that professional institutions are
not sufficient to maintain the necessary professional virtues? This
second claim is both more important and more complex than the first.
It rests on a proper understanding of the relationship between professional institutions and the state, which in turn requires a significant
redefinition of professional institutions themselves. In the traditional
understanding, the decisions of professional bodies to admit or expel
members must have the force of law; that is, in effect, what it means
for the profession to have a monopoly on the provision of a particular
service. But the legal sword that guards the gate to professional practice is necessarily double-edged. This is what the traditional treatments of the professions, both favorable and critical, overlook.
The basic problem is this: A professional body, acting with the
force of law in its efforts to guarantee professional virtue, encounters
precisely the same problems as the state, subject to the same limita120

Atkinson, supra note 6.
FREIDSON, THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 3 (“[M]onopoly is essential to
professionalism. . . .”). Id. at 122 (“Ideal-typical professionalism is always dependent
on the direct support of the state. . . .”).
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tions. The regulatory challenge to both the state and the profession is
the same: the dilemma of imposing bright-line rules on conduct ideally left to the conscientious exercise of individual practitioners’ expert
discretion. As we have seen, drawn too tightly, the regulations unduly
restrict the conscientious; left too loose, the regulations do not sufficiently restrain the unscrupulous.122
The professional body not only encounters the same problems as
the state in regulating professional conduct, it also faces the same limitations. Once a professional body’s decisions have the force of law,
that body itself is, as a matter of law, an instrumentality of the state.
Accordingly, the grounds upon which professional bodies admit, discipline, and expel members must be legitimate legal grounds. They
must, in other words, pass muster before all the basic requirements
and limits of liberal law. In particular, the federal constitution protects professional licenses as liberty or property; the state and its instrumentalities can deny or revoke these licenses only with due process of law, both procedural and substantive, and without imposing
unconstitutional conditions.123 Professional bodies, every bit as much
as routine state regulators, are forbidden to deprive people of their
livelihood for violating “know it when I see it” standards. The “void
for vagueness” principle applies to professional bodies as well as state
agencies, for the same reason: Professional bodies whose decisions
carry the force of law are, for precisely that reason, agencies of the
state.
But the ideal standard of performance, in law and medicine, respectively, cannot be stated with much more clarity than this: balance
the interests of private clients with a proper concern for the public
interest; be as attentive to individual patients as you possibly can.
Holmes’s famous dictum that the law is for the bad man implies, for
present purposes, its limitation: The law can punish people who fall
below certain minimally acceptable standards, but the law cannot
force people to be ideally good.124 In the practice of law, the state can
punish those who violate the letter of the law, but it cannot punish
those who refuse to commit themselves to its spirit. To try to do that
would produce this infinite regress: a literal law that commanded obe-
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See supra Part I.A.2.
See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70
(1972); see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 544 (1968); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957).
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dience to the law’s spirit, and another law that commanded obedience
to that law’s spirit, ad infinitum.125
In the practice of medicine, similarly, the state can punish those
who fall below minimum standards of care, but it cannot punish those
who fail to treat their patients as they themselves would want to be
treated. The Golden Rule, for all its vaunted universality, is too vague
to be made legally binding in any liberal state; it may well be the spirit
of all secular law, but it can never be adequately incorporated into any
legally binding obligation. That is at least part of the Gospel’s message: “[T]he letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”126 For all the
reasons Lon Fuller identified nearly five decades ago, the law in its
punitive capacity can set its standards for individual conduct only so
high; if we aspire to more than the law can mandate, we must look to
other institutions.127
This means two fundamental things for professional institutions,
one negative, the other positive. First, the bad news—professional
bodies cannot, by exercising the state’s coercive powers, guarantee
the professional virtues that we have seen to be necessary for the optimal delivery of professional services. They cannot make doctors
adequately attentive to their individual patients’ health nor lawyers
sufficiently mindful of the public interest.
Now, the good news—professional bodies can, by a multitude of
noncoercive means, cultivate those professional virtues that neither
the market nor the state can guarantee. Professional bodies cannot
deny their members basic property or liberty interests under vague,
“know it when I see it,” standards, but that does not mean that these
standards are neither meaningful nor useful. Quite the contrary,
sometimes experts really do recognize subtle but significant departures from occupational ideals too lofty for the law to incorporate.
What’s more, nothing in the law forbids professional bodies to make
these ideals the basis for a system of relatively effective sanctions,
both positive and negative. On the negative side, it can reprimand or
admonish, publicly or privately, members who lapse from the professional ideal; on the positive side, it can reward self-abnegating, otherregarding conduct with comradely commendations and mutual re-

125
See Atkinson, supra note 20, at 283–84, 287–94; John F. Sutton, Jr., Outlawing Unjust Rules of Law: A Response to Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1517
(1989). The author parodies as a solution to legal but unjust results obtained by litigation a proposal to “[e]nact yet another law – but this time, an awesomely overriding
law that outlaws lawyers’ ‘quibbling’[.]” Id.
126
2 Corinthians 3:6.
127
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30–32 (1964).
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spect.128 Armed with this more extensive arsenal and able to take
more precise aim at the problems of professional misconduct, professional bodies may indeed be able both to set their standards higher129
and to apply them with greater precision than either the law or the
market.130
These, then, are the two absolutely fundamental points about professional institutions and professional virtues, each precisely complementary to the other: On the one hand, professional institutions can no
more guarantee essential professional virtues through legal coercion
than can the regulatory state; on the other hand, professional institutions may, by noncoercive means, be able to provide levels of professional virtue beyond what the market and state can provide. To
properly appreciate the role of professional institutions, we must neither overestimate nor underestimate their power. The standard theory
of the professions pays too little attention to the limits of professional
institutions. Revisionist theorists pay too little attention to professional institutions’ potential to promote the necessary professional
virtues, insisting that all talk of professional virtue is cant and that
professional bodies exist only to advance the interest of their members
against the laity.
Just because the law, acting through either state or professional
institutions, cannot guarantee professional virtues does not mean that
we do not need those virtues. Even though there is no way through
legally coercive means to ensure that doctors are especially careful or
that lawyers are attentive to the public interest, our society is still better off if they are. And, just because there are no legal means to ensure these virtues, it does not follow either that the law has no role in
their encouragement or that other institutions cannot promote them by
128
Parsons, supra note 13, at 43–46; FREIDSON, supra note 4, at 108; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 7 (2010) (In addition to the rules of
professional conduct, “a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble
(1980) (Although the lawyer is to be guided by both the Code and personal conscience, “in the final analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a
lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct” and “the possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”).
129
See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 21 (1986) (noting that lawyers may be subject to civil remedies, criminal sanctions, and other formal
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THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 (2000).
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other means. The converse is, in fact, true on both counts: professional organizations without the coercive power of the state can insist that
their members embrace and embody the necessary virtues, even as the
state, by non-coercive means, can encourage all practitioners to do the
same. The latter is an entirely appropriate, if peripheral, function of
the law;131 the former is the core function of professional institutions,
properly understood. The state can urge its professionals to be virtuous, even as it can urge its soldiers to be brave and its citizens to be
patriotic. Professional bodies, by contrast, promote virtue by persuasive means as their core mission.
C.

Re-Integrating Professional Knowledge, Virtues,
and Institutions: Refining the Ideal-Type
Profession

Maintaining the necessary balance between the limits and capacities of professional institutions, both in theory and in practice, requires
a major refinement in our understanding of the role of those institutions, particularly their relationship with the state and the market.
This section first sets out that refinement, then compares it with the
prior understanding of both functionalists and revisionists.
1.

A New Taxonomy of Professional Virtue: One
Genus, Two Species

We have seen that the definition of a profession common to both
its defenders and its critics does not fit what both take to be the paradigmatic profession, the modern practice of medicine, with respect to
either of its essential parts, its substantive claim about professional
knowledge and its formal claim about professional organization.
With respect to the knowledge claim, we saw in Part I that the practice
of medicine does not require the “wedding of special and general
knowledge” that is supposed to distinguish the professions from other
occupations that involve advanced technical knowledge. By contrast,
we saw that law does in fact require just such a “wedding.”
But we also saw that it is not that particular kind of “hybrid”
knowledge alone that distinguishes law from other occupations that
entail the application of formal knowledge. The practice of law requires that wedding of general and special knowledge for the benefit
of both private clients and the public good; only in the latter case,
however, are both the market and the state predictably unable to guar131
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antee the proper application of that knowledge. What makes the practice of law distinct, therefore, seems to be, not a particular kind of
formal knowledge, but rather a constellation of factors that makes the
optimal delivery of that kind of knowledge impossible for the market
and the state to ensure.
With that insight, in this Part we looked back at the practice of
medicine and found a similar constellation of factors: for a variety of
related reasons, the level of care our society insists on from its practicing physicians, like the commitment to the public good that our republic requires of its lawyers, cannot be guaranteed by either the market
or the state. On the other hand, that level of care, like lawyers’ commitment to the public good, may well be enhanced by special institutions of the occupation itself.
We can now draw these points together into a significant refinement of the functionalist definition of a profession:
A profession is an occupation that delivers a socially significant
service entailing university-based knowledge under conditions in
which optimal performance requires of practitioners an occupationrelated virtue—principal-protective in the caring professions, publicprotective in the public professions—which neither private contracts
nor state regulation can adequately guarantee, but which special occupational institutions can significantly enhance.
This is, obviously, a definition that only a sociologist or a lawyer
could love; even for us, it admittedly needs a good bit of unpacking if
its full implications are to be clear.
The first step in unpacking this definition is to notice that the genus of neo-classical professional virtue—the personal commitment
essential to the optimal deployment of professional knowledge—has
two distinct species, of which medicine and law provide the respective
paradigms: principal-protecting virtue and public-protecting virtue.
The next step is to trace that division back to the dual government and
market failure that professions typically address. And then we can
better see how addressing these failures produces two distinctive
kinds of professions, parallel to, but not quite congruent with, the traditional distinction between “learned” and “caring” professions.
Recall that professions address two basic forms of market failure:
information asymmetries and externalities.132 Information asymme132

See POSNER, supra note 23, at 112–13; see also S EIDENFELD , supra note
24, at 63–67; see FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 79
(“The requirement of discretionary specializations . . . and most particularly those
based on esoteric, abstract theory, poses a serious problem to prospective labor consumers. How are they to judge whether a particular worker is able to perform tasks
adequately?”).
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tries typically pose the risk that the service provider will exploit the
consumer; externalities typically threaten third parties or the public.133
The distinctive problem with the practice of medicine is insufficient
attention to patients, the recipients of the services in question—
failure, in other words, properly to apply specialized knowledge for
the patient’s benefit. The distinctive problem with the practice of law,
by contrast, is insufficient attention to the public interest, failure
properly to apply knowledge of the public good in the course of representing private clients. The besetting “vices” of doctors and lawyers
are thus distinct, each involving exploitation of a different but fundamental form of market failure.
It is important to notice, however, that this “mapping” of professional virtues and vices onto market failures is not perfect. Not all
information asymmetries and externalities require professions. Some
market failures can be adequately addressed by other means, typically
routine government regulation. Only when those means are inadequate is it necessary to rely on professional virtue and the professional
institutions that sustain it as guarantees of professional performance.
Even as the two distinctive professional virtues we have identified
do not map perfectly onto the general forms of market failure that
underlie them, so the two kinds of professions that embody those virtues do not quite perfectly map onto the existing subcategories of professions. Public-protective professions like law and principalprotecting professions like medicine cannot quite accurately be described as “learned” and “caring” professions, respectively. Our refinement of the general definition of profession implies its own subsets, with clearer bounds and foundations than the subcategories previously offered.
There is, to be sure, obvious overlap. Public-protecting professions must be versed not only in university-based formal knowledge,
but also in the general cultural knowledge of a liberal education. Public-protecting professionals, then, are more learned than principalprotecting professions in the sense that practitioners of publicprotective professions must master two forms of learning, not just one.
And principal-protecting professions must be especially careful in the
application of their occupational knowledge to the particular individuals whom they serve. They must be, in that sense, more caring than
public-protective professions. Thus it would make sense to see the
133

See Morgan, supra note 30, at 705, 710–11 (“[T]he costs of dispute resolution and the impact of delay are rarely limited to the particular parties–the social costs
involved are borne by society as a whole.”).
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public-protective professions as distinctly “learned” and the clientprotective professions as distinctly “caring.”
But these associations between the two professional virtues we
have just identified and the two terms in common use for subcategories of professions are also misleading. For one thing, it is the publicprotecting professions’ commitment to the public good, every bit as
much as their knowledge of the public good, that sets them apart; in
that critical respect, they are as much “caring” as “learned.” What
distinguishes them from principal-protecting professions is not that
they are less caring, but rather that their care has a different focus.
Even as the public-protective professions are not less caring in
this respect, so, too, the principal-protective professions are not less
learned in another. Their knowledge, like the public-protective professional’s care, simply has a different focus. What’s more, the traditional terms are unfortunately asymmetrical: “learned” refers to the
professional knowledge base, not the professional virtue; “caring”
refers to the professional virtue, not the professional knowledge base.
For all these reasons, then, the traditional terms “learned” and
“caring” are not entirely adequate synonyms for “public-protecting”
and “principal-protecting.” On the other hand, the latter, more precise
terms suffer disadvantages of their own. For one thing, they are neologisms; for another, their hyphenated form probably costs as much in
unwieldiness as it adds in symmetry and accuracy. The discussion
that follows, then, sometimes uses the terms “public” and “caring” as
convenient short-hands, bearing in mind the qualifications noted here.
As we shall see, these qualifications are quite important, because they
involve the deepest difference between our refined understanding of
the professions and its predecessors.
2.

Comparison with the Prior Definition

At this point it will be helpful to compare the refined definition of
profession with the more traditional definition. We begin with the
basic point of agreement, the common focus on professional function,
and then examine the most significant difference, the new definition’s
focus on professional virtue.
a.

The Basic Agreement: A Common
Focus on Professional Function

The most significant thing about the refined definition is this: it is
a refinement, not a rejection, of the standard definition. It keeps in
place all three defining features of the classic professions: (1) formal
learning in service of an essential social function, (2) the performance
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of which service cannot be guaranteed by the “normal” means of government-regulated private contracts between providers and consumers, (3) thus requiring special professional institutions.
The practice of both law and medicine entails the application of
university-based knowledge in the performance of two critical social
functions, respectively, maintaining optimal order in a complex society and promoting the physical health of individuals. And the application of both kinds of specialized knowledge presents problems for the
presumptive mode of production in a capitalist market economy (contracts between providers and consumers, subject to regulation by the
state to protect both consumers and the public). The institutions of
professionalism offer better ways to guarantee proper deployment of
professional knowledge than the institutions of market regulation
alone. All this is entirely consistent with prevailing theory.
b.

The Critical Distinction: A New
Focus on Professional Virtue

That said, it is important to underscore the one salient way in
which the revised ideal type differs from prior versions: its focus on
professional virtue. This new focus improves the older definition in
two related ways. It shows both why specialized knowledge is not
sufficient to account for professional status and why market closure is
not necessary.
(1)

Specialized Knowledge as
an Insufficient Condition

The standard ideal-type profession tends to be either over- or under-inclusive. On the one hand, if we treat as professions all occupations that involve the discretionary application of university-based
formal knowledge, we sweep in occupations like actuaries that seem
to perform adequately under routine conditions of regulated markets.
On the other hand, if we narrow the definition by insisting that university-based formal knowledge be somehow “wedded” to a universitylevel liberal education, we find that medicine, along with actuarial
science, falls on the non-professional side of the line. Once we focus
on professional virtue as an element that is both essential to the adequate delivery of certain kinds of specialized knowledge and yet impossible to secure with either private contracts or state regulations,
then the problems of both under- and over-inclusiveness disappear.
Not all occupations that require the application of universitybased knowledge, even in the performance of the most socially significant of purposes, would qualify as professions under the revised defi-
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nition of professional, but only those occupations that, in addition,
pose problems of both market- and government-failure like those that
beset the practice of law and medicine. Proper application of some
kinds of university-based knowledge to vital social functions may
well be sufficiently handled by the usual regulatory methods (e.g.,
government licensing of suppliers and monitoring of contracts between suppliers and consumers).
Professional virtue, on this analysis, is what unites the functions
of professions, the delivery of socially significant special knowledge,
with their form, the institutions necessary to ensure that delivery.
Professional virtue is what guarantees the proper application of professional knowledge; professional virtue is something only professional institutions can provide.134 If the state regulation of ordinary
for-profit suppliers is adequate to ensure proper delivery of an occupation’s particular kind of formal knowledge, then that occupation need
not be organized as a profession. Thus, medicine and law can be seen
as proper professions; actuarial science cannot.
(2)

Market Control as an
Unnecessary Condition

In addition to adding an element, professional virtue, omitted by
the standard model, the revised ideal type drops an element that the
standard model includes—market closure. Both functionalists and
revisionists tend to assume that, in order for an occupation that applies
formal knowledge to be a profession, it must have state-delegated
power to control delivery of its service. To be a profession, in other
words, a knowledge-based occupation must also exercise a stateauthorized monopoly. And, conversely, both functionalists and revisionists tend to assume that if an occupation that delivers the requisite
kind of knowledge achieves market control it has also achieved professional status.
Our focus on professional virtue suggests that, here again, the traditional version of the ideal type is both over- and under-inclusive. It
is over-inclusive because it recognizes as professions knowledgebased occupational monopolies that do not require professional virtue

134
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One distinguishing feature of any profession . . . is that membership entails an
ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to
standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the
discipline of the market.”).
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to perform adequately (e.g., certified public accountants).135 On the
other hand, the focus on market closure may be under-inclusive because it fails to recognize as professions occupations that require both
professional knowledge and professional virtue for their proper performance, even though they do not need a state-sponsored monopoly
to ensure professional knowledge.136 As I have argued elsewhere, this
seems to be the case with elite business management.137 The problem
here is not information asymmetry, but externalities. The corporations that hire managers may well be able to determine whether they
possess and competently deploy the necessary knowledge base.138 If
so, the employers of corporate management have no need for either
occupational licensing or professional virtue. But the public needs
business executives to be attentive to the public good, not just their
client’s interest. And this public-protective virtue is precisely what
legal controls cannot guarantee.
3.

Summary

This section’s revision of the ideal-type profession leaves the core
of the traditional ideal type intact: A profession is an occupation that
applies university-based education in the service of socially important
services, under conditions where neither private contracts nor state
regulation can ensure proper performance of that service. This revision is nonetheless significant. It has added one element, professional
virtue, even as it has subtracted another, market control. The result is
an ideal-type profession that is neither over-inclusive nor underinclusive, because it recognizes as proper professions only those occupations in which the professional mode of organization actually
enhances the occupation’s function, delivering university-based information in the provision of a significant social service.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEO-CLASSICAL
PROFESSIONALISM

Building on Part II’s refined definition of professionalism, this
Part spells out the fuller implications of those refinements, particularly
the emphasis on professional virtue. Part III.A continues to test those
135

See ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 215, 226–39 (identifying “quantitative information professionals,” including engineers, accountants, and statisticians).
136
See id. at 9 (“Any occupation can obtain licensure (e.g., beauticians) . . .
.”).
137
Atkinson, supra note 6, at 56–57.
138
See supra Part II.B.
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refinements against the practices of medicine and law, and, vice versa,
to test medicine and law against that refined definition. Focusing on
the defining virtues of the two paradigmatic professions clarifies how
those two professions should be structured to foster their distinctive
virtues, even as it shows how a proper understanding of the role of
those virtues gives us a more precise understanding of the proper parameters of medicine and law and, more generally, of the caring and
public professions as a whole. Part III.B extends the refined definition of professionalism to other occupations, the better to mark the
line between the professional and the non-professional. And that, in
turn, gives us a better sense of the distinction between professional
virtues and other occupational virtues. Finally, Part III.C shows how
law and medicine as the paradigmatic principal-protecting and publicprotecting professions not only serve our society, but reciprocally
depend upon and define that society itself. Ours is a society that creates professionals, even as professionals sustain our society’s core
values.
A.

Revisiting Medicine and Law: Refining the Basic
Concepts, Reforming the Paradigmatic
Professions

Part I contrasted the practices of medicine and law to show that
medicine lacks what traditional theory has made a hallmark of idealtype professions: a wedding of university-based technical knowledge
with a classical liberal education. Physicians can perform their core
function, providing individual health care, without a grounding in
historical debates about the public good; lawyers necessary participate
in that very debate in performing their core function, providing justice
under law. Part II showed how a closer look at medicine and law
suggests a significant modification of traditional theory. We traced
the foundation of medicine’s professional standing to a different
source, the distinctive professional virtue of care.
On that analysis, what links medicine and law as professions is
the necessity for professional virtue, a kind of commitment to occupational performance on the part of doctors and lawyers, which cannot
be optimally guaranteed by either the market or the state, but which
can be significantly enhanced by professional bodies acting without
the force of law. On the other hand, what distinguishes medicine from
law, at the highest level of generality, is precisely this distinctly professional virtue. In medicine, that virtue is client-protective; in law, it
is public-protective; medicine, then, is the paradigm of the caring professions, even as law is the paradigm of the public professions. We
were thus able to see law and medicine as paradigms of two basic
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professional categories, the principal-protecting or caring professions
and the public-protective or public professions. Here we take up that
line of analysis again, the better to understand both the professions of
law and medicine and the caring and public professions more generally.
Our revised understanding of the ideal-type profession, drawn
largely from our examination of the distinctive functions of law and
medicine, has implications for those occupations as they are now constituted, even as those arrangements point to further refinements in the
theory itself. This analysis begins with the respective cores of medicine and law, then looks at areas of overlap, and concludes with areas
of practice at the peripheries of both professions.
1.

At the Core of the Legal and Medical
Professions: Preserving the Critical Virtues

Both functionalists and revisionists agree that professional form
should follow professional function; professional institutions should
be organized to ensure professional performance. Functionalists and
revisionists differ, of course, on how closely occupational reality
matches the theoretical ideal. Our revised ideal type of professionalism, with its focus on professional virtue, sharpens that debate. Given
that professional virtue is a necessary precondition of the proper deployment of professional knowledge, the professions should be structured so as to enable and encourage individual practitioners to exercise their professional virtue. If the primary need for professional
institutions is to ensure professional virtue, then the primary goal of
professional institutions should be to enhance, or at least not undermine, that virtue. To paraphrase the Hippocratic Oath: Every professional institution should improve professional performance; none
should make it worse.
This basic principle has obvious and important implications for
our two paradigmatic professions, law and medicine. In the case of
medicine, anything that systematically undermines the physician’s
ability to give the appropriately high level of care to an individual
patient is presumptively dysfunctional. And a precisely parallel analysis applies to law. Anything that systematically undermines the lawyer’s ability properly to weigh a private client’s interest against the
public interest is, again, presumptively suspect.
When we apply that principle to doctors and lawyers, we note a
paradox that underscores the importance of distinguishing between the
caring and the learned professions: What is good for promoting professional virtue of one kind may well be bad for the other. Institution-
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al arrangements that encourage proper performance in one kind of
profession may be truly devastating if imported into the other kind.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of professional compensation. The necessary structure of payments in the private practice of
law might well undermine client-protective virtue in medicine. In a
basically capitalist economy, those who consume goods and services
typically pay for them; all things being equal, that ensures that resources are efficiently allocated or, more colloquially, that consumers
get what they pay for. But, of course, things are not always equal;
two basic forms of market failure, information asymmetries and externalities, sometimes upset the market’s normal equilibrium. As we
have seen, professional virtue, enhanced by professional institutions,
is the optimal solution to these two problems in certain situations.
We now need to notice how market factors not only produce the
need for professional virtue, but also influence the likelihood of its
effectiveness. The basic point is this: if the source of payment for
professional services is different from the beneficiary of professional
virtue, professional virtue will predictably suffer. This asymmetry of
incentives is at the very root of the defining problem of the legal profession. Private clients typically pay for their own lawyers; conversely, those lawyers’ attention to the public good redounds primarily to
the benefit of third parties or the public, not to private clients. Accordingly, private clients have every reason to pay top dollar for lawyers who advance private client interests the most and attend to the
public good the least. For reasons nicely isolated in the literature on
legal insurance and civil legal assistance, it would be very difficult to
structure third-party payment for legal services.139 We seem to be
stuck, then, with a system of compensating lawyers that entails direct
disincentives against the legal profession’s defining virtue.
In traditional medical care, by contrast, the relationship between
the beneficiary of the professional virtue and the payment for the professional service is quite different. When patients pay their own doctors, patients themselves benefit from the doctor’s distinctive professional virtue, a level of care beyond what the market or the state could
guarantee. As our society moves, for various reasons, away from patient payment to third party payment, we move from that traditional
identity of payer and beneficiary toward a situation more like that of
law, where payer and beneficiary are typically different.
Precisely here, however, we need to notice a significant distinction between the two situations: in law, those who pay for the service
139
See Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment: Beyond the
Insurance Defense Paradigm, 16 REV. LITIG. 585, 607–10 (1997).
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and those who receive the principal benefit of professional virtue are
not only different, but also almost inevitably antagonistic. Private
client’s pay for legal services; the distinctive virtue of lawyers protects the public interest against what lawyers might do for those very
clients. Third party payments for doctors’ services would inevitably
separate the payer from the beneficiary, but that need not make their
interests antagonistic. In restructuring payments for medical services,
we may be able to select for arrangements that are more protective of
the basic virtue of doctors—single-minded attention to care for their
patients.
In seeking these arrangements, interestingly, the factor most relevant to preserving professional virtue on the part of doctors may be
preserving choice on the part of patients. And patient choice would
be important whether the third-party payment system were public or
private. Without the chastening effect of patient choice in a private
system, for-profit payers might tend to profit by favoring doctors who
skimp on patient care. And without the chastening effect of patient
choice in a public system, doctors would certainly have an incentive
to slack off on patient care. In any case, a system of third-party payments for medical care should focus on structures that enhance or
preserve the basic professional virtue of doctors—higher levels of
care than either the market or the state can ensure.140

140

There is, of course, another side to this story. Although, ex hypothesi,
only members of caring professions can be expected to insist upon the appropriately
high level of individual care that we have identified, this is not to say that individual
physicians should have carte blanche in all questions of patient care. By our standard,
that, too, is automatically suspicious, for converse reasons. The very exercise of their
defining virtue, single-minded devotion to individual patients, means that, in the case
of each particular patient, the physician is likely to focus on benefits to that patient
and to ignore costs to other parties and the public.
This dilemma, of course, is very near the central issue of all third-party health-care
systems, and such systems, already widespread, show every indication of expanding.
Identifying the role of the physician’s defining virtue in this dilemma obviously has
important implications for its resolution. On the one hand, cost-containment will
surely have to entail the establishment of treatment protocols that incorporate some
form of cost-benefit analysis, some weighing of benefits to individual patients against
costs to third parties; as we have seen, the setting of these parameters is quite beyond
the purview of doctors, acting as doctors; it entails questions of the public good outside the scope of their professional expertise as health-care providers. On the other
hand, the survival of the level of care that we depend upon doctors, as caring professionals, to ensure demands that control of individual patient care remain essentially in
their hands. Members of the caring professions, paradigmatically doctors, must preside over the care of individual patients. The lesson for present purposes is this: Any
systemic shifting of responsibility for individual patient care away from physicians
and onto nonprofessionals is, by our standard, automatically suspicious.
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That leads to a final, broader point, which is something of a paradox: law may be more essentially a profession than medicine, precisely because law’s distinctive virtue is always more at risk. Third party
payments for medical services do not necessarily place patients at
odds with their doctors, consequently, the professional virtue of patient care is not in grave danger. On the other hand, that antagonism
is virtually unavoidable in the case of the private practice of law,
where lawyers’ public-protective virtue functions specifically to counterbalance the interests of the private clients who pay them. Here is
the paradox: because the standard mode of lawyers’ compensation is
inherently corrosive of their professional virtue, the practice of law is,
for that very reason, all the more in need of strong professional institutions.
2.
In Between the Principal-Protecting and
Public-Protecting Professions
Law and medicine, we have seen, are paradigms, respectively, of
the public and the caring professions. The critical legal function of
making appeals to the public good requires general cultural
knowledge; the care of individual patients demands an extraordinary
measure of devotion to each individual patient. As soon as we apply
these templates to the actual work of lawyers and doctors, however,
we note several significant mismatches between the “ideal” and the
“real.” Sometimes a medical or legal specialty will need the defining
virtue of the other profession, in addition to, or even instead of, its
own. More significantly, sometimes a medical or legal specialty will
require neither virtue; conversely, sometimes an occupation allied to
law or medicine but not recognized as a part of that profession will
require its virtue, and thus warrant inclusion in its ranks. All of these
anomalies require appropriate adjustments in professional status, in
both theory and practice.
a.

Hybrids: Double Doses of
Professional Virtue

Let’s consider first the easiest case, specialties in law and medicine that seem to involve elements of the other profession’s defining
virtue. Some medical doctors may need a commitment to the public
good, even as some lawyers may need especially great concern for an
individual client’s welfare. This seems to be true of doctors who deal
with mental health and lawyers who deal with family crises.
Psychotherapy nicely represents this kind of amphibious medical
specialty; its practitioners need not only the extraordinary care that all
doctors owe their patients, but also the appreciation of fundamental
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social norms that makes law a public profession. Mental health, far
more than physical health, is a matter of enabling individual patients
to integrate themselves successfully into contemporary society, that,
in turn, entails a deep enough appreciation of society to call its norms
and mores into question. To take only the most salient example, homosexuality was all too recently listed as a disorder to be treated; 141
now we (generally) recognize gay and lesbian lifestyles as entirely
legitimate and (generally) treat homophobia as aberrant and discrimination based on sexual preference as immoral, even illegal.
In order to appreciate where the necessary adjustments need to be
made, in the patient or in the patient’s social setting, the psychotherapist has to be able to assess both individual and society, in consultation with professional colleagues, by the most basic norms of our
common culture.142 If they are truly to be healers of the soul, they
must have the fullest possible understanding of what our culture understands to be the whole range of possibilities for not just “mental
health,” but also human flourishing.
The practice of family law involves a comparable duality of professional virtues. Perhaps in large part because of their close practical
alliance with psychotherapists, lawyers who deal with families in crisis must be deeply caring as well as a committed to the public good.
On the one hand, clients in such cases are often extraordinarily distraught, and the issues they present are among the most fundamental
imaginable—the economic and social restructuring of relations among
parents and children. The resolution of these issues may well determine not only the quality, but even the duration, of life itself, and thus
requires the utmost care on the part of lawyers. On the other hand, the
standard of determining custody issues nicely illustrates the need for
family lawyers also to be well versed in both the humanities and the
social sciences. That standard, the best interest of the child, incorporates into law a balancing of the most profound values in our common
culture, guided by the most subtle assessments of our social science.143 Thus, even as “doctors of the soul” must be liberally learned
as well as caring, so lawyers for families in crisis must be not only
liberally learned, but also caring.
141

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, APA DOCUMENT REFERENCE NO. 730008,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISTURBANCE: PROPOSED CHANGE IN
DSM-II, 6TH PRINTING, PAGE 44 POSITION STATEMENT (RETIRED) (1973), available at
http://www.torahdec.org/Downloads/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf.
142
See Judith H. Katz, The Sociopolitcal Nature of Counseling, 13 THE
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 615, 615 (1985) (stating that the psychologist’s profession has “at its core a set of cultural values and norms by which clients are judged”).
143
See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA
FREUD, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, at xiii (1998).
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Exceptions that Prove the Rules:
Branches of One Profession with the
Virtues of the Other

In more peculiar cases, a specialty in one profession may need the
virtue of the other, not in addition to its own, as we have just seen
with psychotherapy and family law, but instead of its own. In this
latter situation, doctors would place the public interest above care for
individual patients, even as lawyers would weigh the interests of individual clients much more heavily against the public interest than
would normally be appropriate. This “virtue reversal” might be true,
for example, of epidemiologists, who must look to the public health
rather than to the health of particular individuals. It might also be true
of lawyers who represent defendants accused of serious crimes, especially those punishable by death. The public health doctors must be
committed to advancing the public good, even as typical lawyers are;
criminal defense lawyers need to be especially careful of the cases of
an individual client in a very vulnerable position even as typical doctors are.
In the special case of criminal defense lawyers, as in the case of
the typical physician, the life of the layperson is in the hands of the
professional. Death-row inmates will quite literally die, not only if
their lawyers make mistakes, but also if they fail to go to lengths heroic by any ordinary measure of professional competence. And criminal
defense lawyers need be less concerned with any public interest running counter to their individual client’s interest, since in every criminal case the public interest is doubly protected, by the public prosecutor advancing the case and by the judge hearing the case.
On the other hand, epidemiologists hardly need exercise the kind
of care required of doctors who treat individual patients, and may indeed be hampered by it—as, for example, when the need to identify
sources of contagion conflicts with the privacy interests of the individuals infected. With public health doctors and criminal defense
lawyers, then, professional virtues are largely reversed.
c.

On the Frontiers of the Paradigmatic
Professions

We have seen that some recognized medical and legal specialties
require the defining virtue of the other profession, either in addition to
or instead of their own. Now we need to consider two logically and
practically related possibilities: in analyzing some practice areas to
determine whether they need the relevant professional virtues, we may
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discover both “false positives” and “false negatives.” False positives
will be those specialties recognized today as part of the legal or medical profession, even though they do not require the defining virtues of
either profession, and thus may not properly be part of the profession
at all. False negatives will be those specialties allied to law or medicine that are not considered within either profession, even though they
do require their respective virtues, and thus should be recognized as
part of the appropriate profession. We will consider these opposing
situations in turn: first, occupations that have slipped inside the professional folds without demonstrating proper functions, second, those
with properly professional functions that have been fenced out.
(1)

False Positives:
Faux Professions

To appreciate this situation, consider, first, the cases of pathology
and radiology. Why would a pathologist or radiologist need to exercise any more care of the relevant kind than, say, a technician performing similar analyses? We need both of them to be extremely
careful; neither will likely ever be in the physical presence of a patient, and both will almost certainly be reporting to a primary care
physician. In both cases, what we need is someone, perhaps the primary care physician, ensuring that proper care is being taken.
So, too, with some specialties in the law. Searching real estate titles, probating wills, and securing uncontested divorces are not likely
to implicate basic questions about the public good, much less weighing the interests of private clients against the public good in applying
the law. The law has long recognized that relatively routinized areas
of practice pose less risk of information asymmetries, and thus are
subject to less intrusive state regulation.144 Under our analysis, this
sword may have another edge, which cuts these areas of practice out
of the profession altogether.
(2)

False Negatives:
Unrecognized Professions

As we have just seen, the neo-classical definition of the professions, with its focus on the need for very specific kinds of occupationally-related virtue, would call for some practitioners in the legal and
the medical fields to be considered outside the scope of both profes144

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (finding that risks
to clients associated with advertising of fees for routinized services do not warrant
total prohibition of advertisements).
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sions, properly defined. The converse, however, is equally true, and
almost certainly more significant: Sometimes a highly technical occupation allied to law or medicine and requiring the relevant virtue for
its proper practice has nonetheless not been recognized as a profession
at all.
On the medical side, psychotherapy nicely illustrates this situation. All psychiatrists are medical doctors, but not all psychotherapists are psychiatrists. Some psychotherapists, generally grouped
together as clinical psychologists,145 are typically certified in university-based scientific study and have to undergo supervised clinical training. Their practice, though traditionally not classified as medicine,
would seem to involve a need for the same high level of individual
care as their counterparts in psychiatry.146
On the legal side, the management of publicly-held corporations
nicely illustrates the case of an occupation closely allied with law that
would seem to require not only an equally high level of technical expertise, but also an equal measure of the profession’s defining virtue,
commitment to the public good. And so the calls, now nearly a century old, for management to become a profession have referred not only
to the level of technical training involved, but also the importance of
concern for the public welfare.147
B.

The Professions and Other Occupations

Having refined our neo-classical definition of professionalism in
the paradigm cases of law and medicine, we can now extend it to other occupations, noting in the process some of its more general features. We saw, at the end of the last section, that neo-classical professionalism gives us the criteria for redrawing the borders of the traditional principal-protecting and public-protecting professions, medicine and law. It gives us, in other words, a way to distinguish, within
genuine professions, between those traditional elements that are
properly professional and those that are not.
It is but a small step to apply the same criteria to other occupations further afield. Just as our virtue-based standard can distinguish
between the truly and the spuriously professional elements within the
traditional professions, so it can, by reasonable extrapolation, among
occupations as a whole. At the highest level of generality, this extension would logically entail three steps: (1) determining whether the
occupation in question is a proper profession; (2) deciding whether its
145
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ABBOTT, supra note 8, at 300–01.
See FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 54.
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HEALTH MATRIX

410

[Vol. 22: 345]

essential virtue is public-protecting or principal-protecting (or some
third kind our analysis has not yet identified); and (3) assessing how
well the occupation, in its present form, is performing its particular
function. Each analytic step focuses on professional virtue: whether
the occupation requires professional virtue for its proper function;
whether that virtue is principal-protecting or public protecting; and
how well that occupation, as now organized, is providing that virtue.
Although this is not the place to carry out a detailed analysis of any
other occupation in particular, we can specify here in somewhat greater detail how that analysis would go, which, in turn, will help sharpen
our sense of what neo-classical professional virtue entails.
1.

Professional Virtue as Neo-Classical, not
Retro-Victorian

Since professional virtue will be at the center of this inquiry, we
should first further clarify that core concept. Most basically, bear in
mind that the kind of virtue at issue here is classical, not “Victorian,”
virtue. Its focus is public life, and primarily work; its concern is not
private life, and consensual sexual conduct thus generally lies outside
its scope.148 If it helps, put Queen Victoria’s frumpy portraits out of
mind and recall a marble bust of Marcus Aurelius or, even better, a
photograph of Abraham Lincoln.
Classical virtue, strictly speaking, is the condition of anything,
even an inanimate object, in which that thing does its own work, or
performs its proper function, well. Thus, in classical ethics, it made
sense to say that the virtue of a knife is sharpness and the virtue of a
horse, speed.149 Occupational virtue, by parity of reasoning, is that
condition of the members of a particular occupation most conducive
to their performing that occupation’s central task. Occupational virtue
would thus include both the knowledge required to perform the relevant task and the dispositions or character traits that lead to that
148
As the notes to the ABA’s 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct
make clear, this focus has not always been appropriately sharp. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. (2010) (noting that the traditional concept used to denote
lapses from professional standards of conduct “moral turpitude . . . can be construed
to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery
and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness to practice law”).
149
See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF P LATO 32 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991)
(“‘All right,’ [Socrates] said, ‘does there seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing
to which some work is assigned?’”); see also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
41 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (“It must, then, be remarked that every virtue or
excellence (1) renders good the thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) causes it to perform its function well.”).
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knowledge being applied properly. We can speak, as Socrates did, of
the occupational virtues of gardeners or carpenters just as of doctors
or ministers of state.
Gardeners must know horticulture; it also behooves them to have
“green thumbs,” or special skill, innate or acquired, in putting that
knowledge into practice. So, too, carpenters must know and apply the
tools, materials, and skills of their trade. In the case of physicians the
relevant knowledge would include anatomy and physiology, and the
distinctive disposition would be a particularly high level of care for
the patient’s welfare. Similarly, the lawyer must not only know both
technical matters of procedure and substance and broader matters of
public policy, but also be committed to advancing the public good.
Professional virtue, then, is a genus of occupational virtue, the optimal condition of the practitioner of any occupation for performance
of that occupation’s central task. And occupational virtues are in the
family of classical virtue, the optimal condition of anything in performing its defining function.
2.

Professional Virtue, the Virtues of Other
Occupations, and Other Occupational
Virtues

The fact that professional virtue is a genus of occupational virtue
has several important implications for the relationship of the professions to other occupations. In the first place, to identify specific virtues as essential to the professions is not to suggest that those who
work in other occupations are immoral, or even amoral; it is just to
say, rather, that the virtues that distinguish the professions are distinctive in ways that are essential to their proper functioning. And so,
conversely, even though other occupations’ particular organizations
may help to enhance the performance of their members,150 that alone
does not make those occupations professions.
In the second place, to say that the virtues distinctive of the professions are different from those distinctive of other occupations is not
to deny that all work properly entails certain common virtues.
Although, as we have seen, gardeners have their own special virtues,
knowledge of and skill in horticulture, the better of them also have
“garden variety” or “work ethic” virtues that are not occupationspecific but are, instead, important to almost any imaginable occupa150

See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, P ROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND C IVIC M ORALS
29–31 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1957) (occupations not limited to the classic Anglo-American professions as guarantors of values not otherwise sustained in modern
market economies).
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tion: honesty, discipline, timeliness, efficiency. To focus on specific
occupation-related virtues as distinctive of professionals is neither to
deny, on the one hand, that professionals need these “garden variety”
virtues, nor to assert, on the other hand, that other occupations need
them any less, or more.
Claiming care and public concern as distinctively professional virtues is not tantamount to claiming that they are exclusively professional virtues. All occupations might perform better if their members took
more care for the recipients of their service and showed more concern
for the public good than the law or the market can ensure. What is
distinctive about the professions is that these virtues are especially
important in securing adequate practitioner performance. Beyond
some point, the need for that extra care or public commitment becomes particularly great; in that respect, professional virtue is more a
matter of degree than kind.
Our ordinary language nicely reflects this. One common use of
the word “professional” and its cognates captures this universal aspect
of professional virtue. We say that someone is a professional, as opposed to an amateur or a dilettante, irrespective of that person’s occupation; we mean to say, not that the professional is in any sense meretricious, but rather especially knowledgeable, serious, and committed.
Identifying these distinctive professional virtues does not imply that
all members of any profession actually exhibit the relevant virtue. On
the contrary, some doctors are only as good as the law requires them
to be (and, of course, some are even worse than that); some lawyers
have little or no regard for the public good (and some, little or no regard for basic legality). It is thus quite possible to say that a practitioner has acted “unprofessionally,” without implying actionable incompetence or malpractice. Our theory holds that professional institutions are better guarantors of professional virtue than either the market
or the state in the absence of those institutions, not that those professional institutions are themselves perfect.
This is the paradox of the oft-repeated, much-misleading assertion
that “professionalism” involves standards above those of both the
market and the law. Those standards are not necessarily above what
clients are willing or able to pay for, nor or they necessarily higher
than standards readily derivable from the law itself. Patients might
well be willing and able to pay all the costs of the best possible medical care; thoroughly orthodox accounts of the law see it as necessarily
entailing commitment to the public good on the part of its practitioners.151 The medical virtue of care is thus not alien to the market, any
151
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more than the legal virtue of commitment to the public good is extraneous to the law. Both virtues simply promote a level of performance
above what any combination of enforceable market contracts and
formal legal sanctions can effectively ensure.
It is also misleading to say that members of the professions, even
those who embody those virtues, are somehow more “altruistic” or
less “selfish” than members of other occupations. Nor is it quite right
to say, with Talcott Parsons, that proper professionals take relatively
more satisfaction in occupational proficiency and esteem of occupational colleagues, relatively less in monetary rewards and public acclaim.152 It is more nearly correct to say that professionals’ being so
motivated is more important to their proper occupational performance.
Members of other occupations, as we have seen, can and do exhibit
the levels of care and kind of commitment to the public good characteristic of professionals, and society is the better for it. The critical
difference is that these professional virtues are significantly more important in ensuring proper performance in some occupations than in
others. Again, to say that a certain kind of virtue is critical to professional performance is not to say that professionals alone have that
virtue.
It is also important to notice that, under the neo-classical understanding of professional virtue, professional institutions supplement
the ordinary institutions of the law and the market, but they never
entirely displace them. Professionals are not “above the law” or “outside the market.” They are subject to laws of general application and
the competitive pressures of the market. In fact, many areas of professional performance are almost certainly enhanced by holding professionals to higher, not lower, standards of performance. That, to
take the simplest example, is precisely what professional malpractice
standards attempt to do.153 Similarly, the cost-effective delivery of
many professional services, including those provided by both doctors
and lawyers, has doubtlessly been enhanced by competitive pressures.
Professional institutions are not better guarantors of every aspect of
professional performance than either the market or the state. They are
simply, for the reasons we have seen, better guarantors of professional
virtue, and the critical need for professional virtue is an essential part
of what makes an occupation a profession.
On the other hand, when professional virtue is not an essential
component of occupational performance, professional institutions can
be counterproductive, even perverse. On the consumer side, both
152

PARSONS, supra note 13.
See Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice
Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 878 (2002).
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reformist courts and revisionist commentators have identified many
professional institutions as little more than mechanisms to constrict
supply or raise prices.
And scholars are now increasingly realizing, as courts have long
held, that similar abuses occur on the producers’ side as well, to exploit certain service providers.154 This abuse takes several forms.
Unscrupulous employers may describe workers as “professionals” in
order to exclude them from wage, hour, and other labor benefits; employers may also shift onto “professionals” more work, or more onerous work, rather than hire more workers, buy better equipment, or
deploy more appropriate procedures.155
1.

Comparative Perspective: Professionalism in
Other Times and Places

Professional virtues, on our analysis, are not the only virtues, nor
even the only occupational virtues. They are virtues distinctive of
occupations that have three additional, and distinguishing, features:
They involve the application of (1) formal knowledge, (2) in the provision of an essential social service, (3) that can be better ensured by
professional institutions than market and regulatory measures alone.
At any given time and place, these three critical factors may be more
or less strong. So far, we have limited our analysis to contemporary
American occupations, focusing on today’s practice of medicine and
law in the United States. We should also note, if only briefly, variations in other times and places, and compare them to our paradigmatic
154
See Julia Evetts, Introduction: Trust and Professionalism: Challenges and
Occupational Changes, 54 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 515, 522–24 (2006) (“In general,
then, as organizational budgets become leaner and customers/clients/governments
become more demanding, as service work becomes more closely regulated and
achieving targets are specified, measured, and assessed, so the changes are often
characterized as the need to ‘professionalize’ the service and knowledge workers
concerned.”); see also Julia Evetts, Short Note: The Sociology of Professional
Groups, 54 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 133, 138–39 (“In general, then, as organizational
budgets become leaner and customers/clients become more demanding, as service
work becomes more closely regulated and achievement targets are specified, measured, and assessed, so the changes are often characterized as the need to ‘professionalize’ the service and knowledge workers concerned.”).
155
Working new doctors’ long hours may well jeopardize their ability to
deliver proper care. Faced with that situation, it would be nothing if not perverse to
call on residents to be more careful, rather than simply to reduce the number of hours
in their shifts. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., DUTY
HOURS: COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS § VI.G.1 (July 2011), available at
http://www.acgme.org/acwebsite/home/Common_Program_Requirements_07012011.
pdf.
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public-protecting and principal-protecting professions, law and medicine.
a.
The Necessary Knowledge Base
Consider, first, the matter of formal knowledge. Sometimes the
knowledge required to perform an essential service will not be sufficiently formalized to require its delivery by specialists. That was certainly the case with both medicine and law at important points in the
history of the West.
As scholars have noted, medicine did not attain a firm foundation
in modern science until quite late in the nineteenth century; on the
other hand, it was firmly established in medieval universities, based
on Islamic preservation of classical Greek texts, by the high middle
ages.156 But, before the time of Galen and Hippocrates, it is not at all
clear that a sufficient body of formal knowledge, even of a premodern sort, existed to qualify medicine as a proper profession.
The history of the legal profession illustrates the same factors. No
legal profession, under our standards, existed in classical Athens. For
one thing, everyone argued his or her own case; legal knowledge had
not yet become sufficiently formal to require a body of experts. By
the time of Socrates, such a body was clearly taking shape in the program of the Sophists, who taught the wealthy young men of Athens to
make their own cases before legal bodies. By the time of the late
Roman republic, something identifiable as a prototypical legal profession appeared—a specially trained body of experts argued cases on
behalf of others.
The content of lawyers’ “learning” is not constant either, even in
modern polities with complex legal systems that purport to serve the
common good. For example, a lawyer in the former Soviet Union
might well have qualified as a professional under our revised definition. But the necessary content of his or her education in cultural values would have been Marxism-Leninism, not the deeper and broader
culture of the West, and the world. Similarly, a lawyer in the Islamic
Republic of Iraq would not likely need to know much Aristotle,
although it would have been very different for a lawyer in the service
of the caliphates at Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo.157
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The Relative Strength of Complementary Social Institutions

The practice of law in classical Rome also reminds us of a second
critical factor: the relative roles of the state, the market, and occupational institutions in guaranteeing professional virtue and hence proper
professional performance.158 In classical Rome, both as a republic
and as an empire, the state was not under modern liberal constraints
against promoting a particular vision of the public good. Accordingly,
classical Rome had relatively little need for special professional institutions to promote lawyerly loyalty to the public good; that was comfortably part of the job of the law itself.
Similar factors help account for the relatively greater reliance on
professional institutions to guarantee professional virtue in modern
American, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries. AngloAmerican culture is more reluctant than its Continental and Japanese
counterparts to rely on instrumentalities of the state to perform social
functions. And the converse may also be true: Cultures with relatively
strong states may be suspicious of strong institutions in the private
sector, professional associations included. And some are suspicious
of the institutions of professionalism in particular for non-statist reasons, seeing them as elitist and thus counter-democratic.
This discussion, in turn, points to the final relevant factor: The
relative strength of social institutions may well reflect different underlying rankings of the social values that particular occupations serve.
c.

The Social Ranking of the Values
Professions Serve

As a profession’s knowledge base can vary critically over time
and across cultures, so, too, can the significance that any given society
assigns to the value that a profession applies its special knowledge to
serve. It is hard to imagine a society in which health is not socially
significant; all societies depend, at some level, on the life and health
of their individual members. But it is quite easy to imagine a society
in which the level of care that our society insists on, at least for its
better-off members, is not considered significant. Not all societies
have taken the health of every (well-off) individual as seriously as we,
and not all well-off members of those societies have taken their individual health as seriously. In the past, this may have been because the
after-life loomed larger, or because the level of medical science or
158
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social wealth was too low to make our level of concern a realistic option to any but a tiny few. For any number of reasons, then, the level
of care that requires a special virtue of our doctors may not be a socially significant value. For that reason, as much as for the lack of an
adequate knowledge base or strong institutional framework, it may not
be appropriate to speak, without serious qualification, of a medical
profession in classical Athens or Rome.
The contrast between the practice of law in classical Athens and
in Rome offers an even more telling example of the importance of
how highly a society values what a given profession provides. As we
have seen, Athens had no legal profession; Rome had the unmistakable beginnings of one. But Athens and Rome also differed at a much
deeper level: Athens was a democracy; Rome, a republic. In a state
where ultimate legal authority lies in popular votes, appeal to a public
good beyond the people’s will is, as the case of Socrates shows,159
problematic. If one could imagine a pure democracy, where the people’s will is instantly and ultimately the law,160 appeal to deep cultural
values would be legally irrelevant. Appeal to such values, might, of
course, be politically persuasive;161 nostalgia is a common if not universal sentiment. But one could not say, as a matter of law, that anything other than the people’s immediately expressed will had any legal
significance. In the absence of something like judicial review, lawyers, as lawyers, need know little or nothing about the public good as
anything other than the popular will.
As where the law is the will of all, so also where it is the will of
one. In a classical tyranny, where the will of the monarch was the
ultimate law,162 as in a pure democracy, where the will of the people is
the ultimate law, the law would have no necessary connection with
cultural traditions, and lawyers would not need to be learned in them.
This would not be true, however, of all monarchies: some Roman
emperors, even after institutional restraints on executive authority had
almost totally atrophied, aspired to conserve the values of a republican
constitution. As the Emperor Trajan reminded the lawyer Pliny the
Younger, imperial proconsul for the Roman province of Bithynia,
159
See Plato, The Apology, Phaedo and Crito of Plato, in 2 THE HARVARD
CLASSICS 3, 21–23 (Charles W. Eliot ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1909).
160
See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 34–37 (1970) (outlining a computer-based direct and instantaneous democracy).
161
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 42–46 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954) (noting the
rhetorical power of appeals to those with shared values, “friends to whom the same
162
things are good or evil”).
See PLATO, supra note 149, at 45; ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS 115 (H.W.C. Davis ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008).
162
See PLATO, supra note 149, at 45; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 115 (H.W.C. Davis
ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008).
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executing people based on mass rumor was not their law, even where
the alleged offense was an insult to the emperor as symbolic embodiment of that law itself.163
Radical populism has never needed lawyers learned in the shared
values of a culture’s past. Indeed, every form of radical populism has
abhorred both law that constrains the people’s will and the learned
who remind the people of a public good beyond their private preferences.164 So it was at Socrates’s trial, and so it was in the slogan of
Shakespeare’s brigand: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”165 So it has also been under the extremes of French Jacobism,
American Jacksonianism,166 Russian Bolshevism, and Chinese Maoism. Radical populism cannot tolerate a profession of lawyers committed to classical notions of the public good, even as classical republicanism cannot survive without them.
C.

Paradigm Professions and Our Society: Law and
Medicine as Both Limiting Cases and Cultural
Mirrors

Our paradigmatic professions, law and medicine, demonstrate that
the status of a particular occupation can change over time and differ
across cultures. I have argued that law and medicine, at present, meet
all the basic criteria. But, conditions in our society could change in
ways that would strip either of its professional status.
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LETTERS 243 (Betty Radice trans.,

1978).
164
See FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC, supra note 8, at 162
n.7 (“Revolutions represent the installation of new (though often temporary) legal
institutions.”); id. at 167 n.11 (“In the case of law, popular justice has a short life.”)
(citing EUGENE HUSKEY, RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: THE ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BAR 1917-1939, at 81–82 (1986), for the example of
Lenin’s abolition of the Russian bar in 1921, only to reinstate it later that same year,
with particular reference to the need for defense counsel).
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WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act
4, sc. 2.
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Lest the inclusion of Jacksonian democracy in this litany of populist excesses seem to mark a lapse into hyperbole, or worse, remember the Seminole Wars
and the Cherokee removals. With respect to Marshall’s opinion for the Cherokees’
position in Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), Old Hickory may never actually have said, “Justice Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it,” but
he certainly seems to have acted on the principle. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 428 (2005) (noting that, when “the
Cherokee soon found themselves in need of federal protection” from illegal incursions and physical violence and advised the President of their plight, “Jackson did
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But pressing our analysis of the professions back to the critical
social functions that they serve brings us to another, and very different, set of limits. Even as medicine and law provide the paradigms of
our two subspecies of neo-classical professions, the caring and the
public, so these professions also provide limiting cases of the kind of
society that they serve. A society could, quite conceivably, cease to
treat concern for individual outcomes in any kind of service-delivery
as warranting special care. So, too, a society could cease to treat concern for the public good beyond the aggregation of private preferences
as warranting special commitment. But either of these societies
would be dramatically different from our own. The society that needed no special virtue of care would be much less individualistic than
ours;167 the society that needed no special virtue of public commitment would be much less republican than ours.168
In pressing our analysis of the professions back to the critical social functions that they serve, and the virtues that their practitioners
need in order to perform those functions, we thus come round to a
better understanding not just of our professions, but also of our society. Ours is a society that places a particularly high premium on the
health of individual citizens; ours is also a society in which the will of
the majority, at least as expressed in ordinary legislation, is subordinate to a vision of the public good entrusted to professionals whose
function is, in essential part, to preserve and extend that good as traditionally understood.169 Certain virtues, care for individual patients
and commitment to the public good, are essential for our two paradigm professions to serve that kind of society.
This raises, in turn, another fundamental point about that society
itself: For it to function well, to guarantee the kind of care and public
good to which it is committed, it must assign the relevant professionals the appropriate roles and ensure that the practitioners of those professions have what they need adequately to perform those roles. Even
as our society depends on its paradigm professions for the protection
of its core values, so those paradigm professions depend on our
167

See LARSON, supra note 4, at 19 (“The general ideological climate of
Western societies has favored the functions medicine claims to serve; the value of
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world.”).
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See letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Nov. 17, 1775), in
REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 1775-1783, at 33 (Gordon Wood ed., 2011) (“Virtue, my
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broader society to ensure them their proper place. Our society is, of
course, a liberal democracy, not Plato’s Republic; we are ruled, not by
Platonic guardians, but by the people’s elected representatives and
officials. Our fundamental law bans titles of nobility;170 we cannot
have kings, much less philosopher kings. But our constitution also
establishes a republican form of government, even as it guarantees
that form of government to the states.171 Our highest law, the Constitution itself, is in the hands of judges,172 and our judges must therefore
be scholars of the values our culture holds most dear. If our lawyers
are to understand them and influence them, they must be scholars, too.
If our democracy is to be truly liberal, constrained by principles
beyond the will of any current majority, then our liberalism must be
shaped by the demands of our professions. And so it is. Our society’s
fundamental law includes Roe v. Wade, with its guarantee that access
to medical procedures essential to fundamental human rights cannot
be legally denied, even as Roe v. Wade rests on Marbury v. Madison,
with its echoing declaration that is the fundamental province of the
courts to say what the law ultimately is: what it allows, and forbids,
and requires.
CONCLUSION: FROM THE VIRTUES OF THE PROFESSIONS TO
THE VALUES OF THE REPUBLIC
Our society, as Socrates noted in the passage from The Gorgias173
that I quoted at the outset, values, very near its foundations, health and
justice. Under the conditions of our world, even more than his, those
twin values imply two paradigmatic professions, medicine and law,
one devoted to extraordinary care in attending the health of individuals, the other committed to tempering private interests with concern
for the public good.
Contrary to previous accounts, both functionalist and revisionist,
this account of professionalism in law and medicine has argued that
only public-protective professions like law essentially entail the wedding of university-based technical knowledge with broad cultural education in the liberal arts. Lawyers need to know our culture’s deepest
values in order to form the counterweight to both popular majorities
and plutocratic minorities that is the critical liberal constraint on our
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U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
See supra note 1, and accompanying text.
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political regime;174 doctors do not need that knowledge to provide
even the most scrupulous care to their individual patients.
But this account also implies a reason why others, not only scholars of the professions but also members of the medical profession
themselves, have insisted on liberal education for doctors. Although
liberal education is not essential to the proper exercise of doctors’
defining professional virtue, it has a value in our society that is both
deeper and broader. The value of liberal education is deeper, because
it is not just the foundation of the virtue of any particular profession,
no matter how essential that profession to our society. Liberal education is, rather, the foundation of what we take to be a fully realized
human character, the fullest possible knowledge of oneself and one’s
world. To paraphrase Socrates, it is what we need both to know ourselves and to live an examined life.
The neo-classically republican element of our society teaches us
to see wisdom not just as the essential virtue of those who make and
apply our law, but as the highest human virtue as well. A neoclassical republic must ensure that its lawyers are liberally learned, in
order to serve justice. But that justice entails the maximum cultivation
of all human talent. And so, in a proper republic, even as we as a society need our doctors to be careful, in order to be good doctors, we
will also want them to be liberally learned, to make them the best possible people. And this societal norm has implications at the personal
level as well. We as individuals want those who hold our lives in
their hands to be wise as well as careful, even as those who do not
need liberal learning in their professional lives nonetheless value it in
their personal lives.
The value of liberal education is also broader than any other value
served by even the most important profession, for it is the ultimate
guarantor of truly republican self-government. In a proper republic,
not just lawyers and judges, but every full citizen, would both know
the public good and be committed to its advancement. The revolutionary excesses of the French Jacobins have made “Republic of Virtue” something of a byword; it was our own Federalists, no Francophiles and certainly no radicals, who said, “The aim of every political
Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common
good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual
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ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).
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precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold
their public trust.”175
And this is the final lesson we can draw from our paradigm professions for our fuller society. If our society is to be meaningfully,
not just nominally, republican, it must do more than simply allow
every citizen to express his or her personal preferences in public fora
and political elections. It must give every citizen the fullest possible
opportunity to gain the kind of cultural knowledge and selfunderstanding that is the essential foundation of the legal profession.
We need doctors to be liberally educated, not because our health depends upon them as professionals, but because our republic depends
upon them as citizens. And this implies, ultimately, that the rulers of
our Republic must be both as caring as doctors and as learned as lawyers:
Therefore the first and weightiest commandment of God to the
rulers is this – that more than aught else they be good guardians of
and watch zealously over the offspring.176

175

THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(Modern Library ed., 1937).
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